Support for building with cygwin-2.5.2 + SSPI

Makefile.in

@@ -95,10 +95,11 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
 	kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
 	kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \
 	kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
-	platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o
+	platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o libcrypto-compat.o
 
 SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
-	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o proxy.o
+	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o proxy.o \
+	gss-serv-sspi.o
 
 SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
 	audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
@@ -108,7 +109,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
 	auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
 	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
-	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
+	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o gss-serv-sspi.o \
 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
 	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
 	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \

README.cygwin.md

+
+# NXSSH on Cygwin 2.5.2 with SSPI module
+
+This branch contains the code from master branch plus additional patches
+applied to make it buildable with OpenSSL 1.1.* + cygwin 2.5.2
+
+It also contains patch to enable GSS SSPI feature to support native GSS
+token delegation using Windows SSPI interface.
+
+All applied patches that make this branch different from master are located
+in patches/ subdirectory.
+
+## Building
+
+```bash
+$ WANT_AUTOCONF='2.69' autoreconf -fvi
+$ ./configure --with-sspi
+$ make -j$((`nproc` + 1))
+```
\ No newline at end of file

auth-pam.c

@@ -129,6 +129,10 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
 typedef pthread_t sp_pthread_t;
 #else
 typedef pid_t sp_pthread_t;
+# define pthread_create(a, b, c, d)	_ssh_compat_pthread_create(a, b, c, d)
+# define pthread_exit(a)		_ssh_compat_pthread_exit(a)
+# define pthread_cancel(a)		_ssh_compat_pthread_cancel(a)
+# define pthread_join(a, b)		_ssh_compat_pthread_join(a, b)
 #endif
 
 struct pam_ctxt {

authfd.c

@@ -207,15 +207,22 @@ deserialise_identity1(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
 	int r, keybits;
 	u_int32_t bits;
 	char *comment = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *e = NULL, *n = NULL;
 
 	if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(ids, &bits)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
+	if ((e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (n = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(ids, &bits)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, e)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, n)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, n, e, NULL) == 0)) {
+		BN_free(n);
+		BN_free(e);
 		goto out;
-	keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
+	}
+	keybits = BN_num_bits(n);
 	/* XXX previously we just warned here. I think we should be strict */
 	if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH;
@@ -393,15 +400,17 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(int sock, struct sshkey* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
 	struct sshbuf *msg;
 	int r;
 	u_char type;
+	const BIGNUM *e, *n;
 
 	if (key->type != KEY_RSA1)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(n))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, e)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, n)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, challenge)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put(msg, session_id, 16)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 1)) != 0) /* Response type for proto 1.1 */
@@ -499,15 +508,19 @@ static int
 ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(struct sshbuf *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
 {
 	int r;
+	const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *q, *p, *iqmp;
 
+	RSA_get0_key(key, &n, &e, &d);
+	RSA_get0_factors(key, &p, &q);
+	RSA_get0_crt_params(key, NULL, NULL, &iqmp);
 	/* To keep within the protocol: p < q for ssh. in SSL p > q */
-	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, BN_num_bits(key->n))) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->n)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->e)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->d)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->iqmp)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->q)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->p)) != 0 ||
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, BN_num_bits(n))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, n)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, e)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, d)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, iqmp)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, q)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, p)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comment)) != 0)
 		return r;
 	return 0;
@@ -622,11 +635,13 @@ ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key)
 
 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
 	if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+		const BIGNUM *e, *n;
+		RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg,
 		    SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->n)) != 0)
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(n))) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, e)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, n)) != 0)
 			goto out;
 	} else
 #endif

cipher-3des1.c

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
  */
 struct ssh1_3des_ctx
 {
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX	k1, k2, k3;
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX	*k1, *k2, *k3;
 };
 
 const EVP_CIPHER * evp_ssh1_3des(void);
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ ssh1_3des_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
 	if (key == NULL)
 		return 1;
 	if (enc == -1)
-		enc = ctx->encrypt;
+		enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx);
 	k1 = k2 = k3 = (u_char *) key;
 	k2 += 8;
 	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) >= 16+8) {
@@ -74,12 +74,19 @@ ssh1_3des_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
 		else
 			k1 += 16;
 	}
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k1);
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k2);
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k3);
-	if (EVP_CipherInit(&c->k1, EVP_des_cbc(), k1, NULL, enc) == 0 ||
-	    EVP_CipherInit(&c->k2, EVP_des_cbc(), k2, NULL, !enc) == 0 ||
-	    EVP_CipherInit(&c->k3, EVP_des_cbc(), k3, NULL, enc) == 0) {
+	c->k1 = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+	c->k2 = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+	c->k3 = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+	if (c->k1 == NULL || c->k2 == NULL || c->k3 == NULL) {
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(c->k1);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(c->k2);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(c->k3);
+		free(c);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (EVP_CipherInit(c->k1, EVP_des_cbc(), k1, NULL, enc) == 0 ||
+	    EVP_CipherInit(c->k2, EVP_des_cbc(), k2, NULL, !enc) == 0 ||
+	    EVP_CipherInit(c->k3, EVP_des_cbc(), k3, NULL, enc) == 0) {
 		explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c));
 		free(c);
 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
@@ -95,9 +102,9 @@ ssh1_3des_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, size_t len)
 
 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
 		return 0;
-	if (EVP_Cipher(&c->k1, dest, (u_char *)src, len) == 0 ||
-	    EVP_Cipher(&c->k2, dest, dest, len) == 0 ||
-	    EVP_Cipher(&c->k3, dest, dest, len) == 0)
+	if (EVP_Cipher(c->k1, dest, (u_char *)src, len) == 0 ||
+	    EVP_Cipher(c->k2, dest, dest, len) == 0 ||
+	    EVP_Cipher(c->k3, dest, dest, len) == 0)
 		return 0;
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -108,9 +115,9 @@ ssh1_3des_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
 	struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c;
 
 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k1);
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k2);
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k3);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(c->k1);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(c->k2);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(c->k3);
 		explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c));
 		free(c);
 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
@@ -128,13 +135,13 @@ ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char *iv, int len)
 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp)) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	if (doset) {
-		memcpy(c->k1.iv, iv, 8);
-		memcpy(c->k2.iv, iv + 8, 8);
-		memcpy(c->k3.iv, iv + 16, 8);
+		memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c->k1), iv, 8);
+		memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c->k2), iv + 8, 8);
+		memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c->k3), iv + 16, 8);
 	} else {
-		memcpy(iv, c->k1.iv, 8);
-		memcpy(iv + 8, c->k2.iv, 8);
-		memcpy(iv + 16, c->k3.iv, 8);
+		memcpy(iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(c->k1), 8);
+		memcpy(iv + 8, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(c->k2), 8);
+		memcpy(iv + 16, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(c->k3), 8);
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -142,17 +149,14 @@ ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char *iv, int len)
 const EVP_CIPHER *
 evp_ssh1_3des(void)
 {
-	static EVP_CIPHER ssh1_3des;
-
-	memset(&ssh1_3des, 0, sizeof(ssh1_3des));
-	ssh1_3des.nid = NID_undef;
-	ssh1_3des.block_size = 8;
-	ssh1_3des.iv_len = 0;
-	ssh1_3des.key_len = 16;
-	ssh1_3des.init = ssh1_3des_init;
-	ssh1_3des.cleanup = ssh1_3des_cleanup;
-	ssh1_3des.do_cipher = ssh1_3des_cbc;
-	ssh1_3des.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH;
-	return &ssh1_3des;
+	EVP_CIPHER *ssh1_3des;
+
+	ssh1_3des = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_undef, 8, 16);
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(ssh1_3des, 0);
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(ssh1_3des, ssh1_3des_init);
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(ssh1_3des, ssh1_3des_cleanup);
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(ssh1_3des, ssh1_3des_cbc);
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(ssh1_3des, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH);
+	return ssh1_3des;
 }
 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */

cipher-bf1.c

@@ -89,17 +89,28 @@ bf_ssh1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *out, const u_char *in,
 const EVP_CIPHER *
 evp_ssh1_bf(void)
 {
-	static EVP_CIPHER ssh1_bf;
+	EVP_CIPHER *ssh1_bf;
 
-	memcpy(&ssh1_bf, EVP_bf_cbc(), sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
-	orig_bf = ssh1_bf.do_cipher;
-	ssh1_bf.nid = NID_undef;
+	orig_bf = EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(EVP_bf_cbc());
+	/* block_size, length, flags from openssl/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c:638 */
+	ssh1_bf = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_undef, 8, 32);
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(ssh1_bf, 8);
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(ssh1_bf, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE);
 #ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
-	ssh1_bf.init = bf_ssh1_init;
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(ssh1_bf, ssh1_bf_init);
+#else
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(ssh1_bf,
+	    EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init(EVP_bf_cbc()));
 #endif
-	ssh1_bf.do_cipher = bf_ssh1_cipher;
-	ssh1_bf.key_len = 32;
-	return (&ssh1_bf);
+	/* copy methods and parameters from old EVP_BF_cbc()
+	 * meth_dup does not allow to change type and key_len */
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(ssh1_bf,
+	    EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_cleanup(EVP_bf_cbc()));
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(ssh1_bf,
+	    EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(EVP_bf_cbc()));
+	/* ASN1 params??? */
+	EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(ssh1_bf, bf_ssh1_cipher);
+	return ssh1_bf;
 }
 #endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_BF) */
 

cipher.c

@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp, const struct sshcipher *cipher,
 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, type, NULL, (u_char *)iv,
+	if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, type, (u_char *)key, (u_char *)iv,
 	    (do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
@@ -390,10 +390,6 @@ cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp, const struct sshcipher *cipher,
 			goto out;
 		}
 	}
-	if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)key, NULL, -1) == 0) {
-		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-		goto out;
-	}
 
 	if (cipher->discard_len > 0) {
 		if ((junk = malloc(cipher->discard_len)) == NULL ||
@@ -625,7 +621,7 @@ cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_char *iv, u_int len)
 			   len, iv))
 			       return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		} else
-			memcpy(iv, cc->evp->iv, len);
+			memcpy(iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(cc->evp), len);
 		break;
 #endif
 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
@@ -671,7 +667,7 @@ cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const u_char *iv)
 			    EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, (void *)iv))
 				return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		} else
-			memcpy(cc->evp->iv, iv, evplen);
+			memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(cc->evp), iv, evplen);
 		break;
 #endif
 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
@@ -685,8 +681,8 @@ cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const u_char *iv)
 }
 
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-#define EVP_X_STATE(evp)	(evp)->cipher_data
-#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp)	(evp)->cipher->ctx_size
+#define EVP_X_STATE(evp)	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(evp)
+#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp)	EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(evp))
 #endif
 
 int

configure.ac

@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ AC_SUBST([TEST_SHELL], [sh])
 AC_SUBST(NXCOMPINC)
 AC_SUBST(NXCOMPLIBS)
 
-NXCOMPINC="-I$includedir/nx"
-NXCOMPLIBS="-lXcomp"
+NXCOMPINC="-I../nxcomp"
+NXCOMPLIBS="-L../nxcomp -lXcomp -lstdc++ -lpng -ljpeg -lz"
 
 dnl select manpage formatter
 if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ case "$host" in
 *-*-cygwin*)
 	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
 	dont_check_for_resolv=1
-	LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textmode.o /usr/lib/libminires.a"
+	LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textmode.o"
 	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CYGWIN], [1], [Define if you are on Cygwin])
 	AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES], [1], [Use PIPES instead of a socketpair()])
 	AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1],
@@ -4182,11 +4182,28 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
 AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
 AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
 
+# Check whether user wants SSPI support
+SSPI_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH([sspi],
+	[  --with-sspi             Enable GSSAPI SSPI support],
+	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+		AC_DEFINE([SSPI], [1], [Define if you want SSPI support])
+		AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI], [1],
+			[Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol])
+		AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI_SSPI], [1], [Define if you want GSSAPI SSPI support])
+		GSSLIBS="-lsecur32 -lws2_32"
+		SSPI_MSG="yes"
+	fi ]
+)
+
 # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
 KRB5_MSG="no"
 AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
 	[  --with-kerberos5=PATH   Enable Kerberos 5 support],
 	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+		if test "x$SSPI_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-sspi and --with-kerberos5 together, use one only])
+		fi
 		if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
 			KRB5ROOT="/usr/local"
 		else
@@ -5104,6 +5121,7 @@ echo "                    Manpage format: $MANTYPE"
 echo "                       PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
 echo "                   OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
 echo "                 KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
+echo "                      SSPI support: $SSPI_MSG"
 echo "                   SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
 echo "                 Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
 echo "                     S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"

contrib/win32/win32compat/debug.h

+#pragma once
+// #ifndef __attribute__
+// #define __attribute__(A)
+// #endif
+
+#include "../../../log.h"
+#include "../../../ssherr.h"
+/* Enable the following for verbose logging */
+#if (0)
+#define debug4 debug2
+#define debug5 debug3
+#else
+#define debug4(a,...)
+#define debug5(a,...)
+#endif
\ No newline at end of file

contrib/win32/win32compat/inc/gssapi.h

+/*
+ * Author: Bryan Berns <berns@uwalumni.com>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+ *    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
+ *    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
+ *    and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO
+ * EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+ * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;
+ * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
+ * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
+ * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#pragma once
+
+ /*
+  * This file provides the GSSAPI interface to support Kerberos SSPI within
+  * OpenSSH.  This is only a partial definition of the full GSSAPI specification
+  * since OpenSSH only requires a subset of the overall functionality.
+  *
+  * The definitions are derived from information provided in RFC2744.  In
+  * addition, RFC2743 provides additional information on the GSSAPI
+  * specification and intended operation.
+  */
+
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#define SECURITY_WIN32
+#include <security.h>
+
+/*
+ * Common Structures & Type Definitions
+ */
+
+typedef uint32_t OM_uint32;
+
+typedef char *gss_name_struct, *gss_name_t;
+
+typedef struct cred_st *gss_cred_id_t;
+typedef CtxtHandle *gss_ctx_id_t;
+
+typedef OM_uint32 gss_qop_t;
+typedef OM_uint32 gss_cred_usage_t;
+
+typedef struct gss_buffer_desc_struct
+{
+	size_t length;
+	void *value;
+}
+gss_buffer_desc, *gss_buffer_t;
+
+typedef struct gss_OID_desc_struct
+{
+	OM_uint32 length;
+	void *elements;
+}
+gss_OID_desc, *gss_OID;
+
+typedef struct gss_OID_set_desc_struct
+{
+	size_t  count;
+	gss_OID elements;
+}
+gss_OID_set_desc, *gss_OID_set;
+
+typedef struct gss_channel_bindings_struct 
+{
+	OM_uint32 initiator_addrtype;
+	gss_buffer_desc initiator_address;
+	OM_uint32 acceptor_addrtype;
+	gss_buffer_desc acceptor_address;
+	gss_buffer_desc application_data;
+} 
+gss_channel_bindings_desc, *gss_channel_bindings_t;
+
+/*
+ * Input & Return Flags 
+ */
+
+/* Credential Usage Indication Options */
+#define GSS_C_BOTH      0
+#define GSS_C_INITIATE  1
+#define GSS_C_ACCEPT    2
+
+/* Context Flag Options */
+#define GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG        1
+#define GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG       2
+#define GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG       4
+#define GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG     8
+#define GSS_C_CONF_FLAG         16
+#define GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG        32
+#define GSS_C_ANON_FLAG         64
+#define GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG   128
+#define GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG        256
+#define GSS_C_DELEG_POLICY_FLAG 32768
+
+/* Display Status Code Types */
+#define GSS_C_GSS_CODE  1
+#define GSS_C_MECH_CODE 2
+
+/* Convenience Null Castless Comparison Options */
+#define GSS_C_NO_NAME             ((gss_name_t) 0)
+#define GSS_C_NO_BUFFER           ((gss_buffer_t) 0)
+#define GSS_C_NO_OID              ((gss_OID) 0)
+#define GSS_C_NO_OID_SET          ((gss_OID_set) 0)
+#define GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT          ((gss_ctx_id_t) 0)
+#define GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL       ((gss_cred_id_t) 0)
+#define GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS ((gss_channel_bindings_t) 0)
+
+/* Convenience Initializer For Empty Buffer */
+#define GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER {0, NULL}
+
+/* Default Quality of Protection Code */
+#define GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT 0
+
+ /* Infinite Context / Credential Value */
+#define GSS_C_INDEFINITE ((OM_uint32) 0xfffffffful)
+
+/*
+ * Status & Return Code Processing
+ */
+
+#define GSS_S_COMPLETE 0
+
+#define GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET 24
+#define GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET 16
+#define GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET 0
+#define GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK ((OM_uint32) 0377ul)
+#define GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK ((OM_uint32) 0377ul)
+
+#define GSS_CALLING_ERROR(x)      ((x) & (GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET))
+#define GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR(x)      ((x) & (GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET))
+#define GSS_ERROR(x)              ((x) & ((GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) | (GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)))
+
+#define GSS_S_BAD_MECH             (((OM_uint32)  1ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_BAD_NAME             (((OM_uint32)  2ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE         (((OM_uint32)  3ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS         (((OM_uint32)  4ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_BAD_STATUS           (((OM_uint32)  5ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_BAD_SIG              (((OM_uint32)  6ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_NO_CRED              (((OM_uint32)  7ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT           (((OM_uint32)  8ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN      (((OM_uint32)  9ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL (((OM_uint32) 10ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED  (((OM_uint32) 11ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED      (((OM_uint32) 12ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_FAILURE              (((OM_uint32) 13ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_BAD_QOP              (((OM_uint32) 14ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED         (((OM_uint32) 15ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE          (((OM_uint32) 16ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT    (((OM_uint32) 17ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+#define GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN          (((OM_uint32) 18ul) << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)
+
+#define GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED      (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 0))
+#define GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN      (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 1))
+#define GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN            (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 2))
+#define GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN          (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 3))
+#define GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN            (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 4))
+
+/* 
+ * Function Prototypes 
+ */
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle,
+	gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle, gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer, 
+	gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, gss_name_t * src_name, 
+	gss_OID * mech_type, gss_buffer_t output_token, OM_uint32 * ret_flags, 
+	OM_uint32 * time_rec, gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle);
+
+OM_uint32
+gss_acquire_cred(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_name_t desired_name, 
+	OM_uint32 time_req, gss_OID_set desired_mechs, gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage,
+	gss_cred_id_t * output_cred_handle, gss_OID_set *actual_mechs, 
+	OM_uint32 *time_rec);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_add_oid_set_member(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID member_oid, 
+	gss_OID_set * oid_set);
+
+OM_uint32
+gss_create_empty_oid_set(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID_set * oid_set);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_init_sec_context(
+	OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle, gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle,
+	gss_name_t target_name, gss_OID mech_type, OM_uint32 req_flags, OM_uint32 time_req, gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
+	gss_buffer_t input_token, gss_OID * actual_mech_type, gss_buffer_t output_token, OM_uint32 * ret_flags,
+	OM_uint32 * time_rec);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_delete_sec_context(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle,
+	gss_buffer_t output_token);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_display_name(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_name_t input_name, 
+	gss_buffer_t output_name_buffer, gss_OID * output_name_type);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_display_status(OM_uint32 * minor_status, OM_uint32 status_value,
+	int status_type, gss_OID mech_type, OM_uint32 * message_context, 
+	gss_buffer_t status_string);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_export_name(OM_uint32 * minor_status, const gss_name_t input_name, 
+	gss_buffer_t exported_name);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_get_mic(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, 
+	gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_buffer_t message_buffer, 
+	gss_buffer_t message_token);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_import_name(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer,
+	gss_OID input_name_type, gss_name_t * output_name);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_indicate_mechs(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID_set * mech_set);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_release_buffer(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_buffer_t buffer);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_release_cred(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_cred_id_t * cred_handle);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_release_name(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_name_t * input_name);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_release_oid_set(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID_set * set);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_test_oid_set_member(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_OID member, 
+	gss_OID_set set, int * present);
+
+OM_uint32 
+gss_verify_mic(OM_uint32 * minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, 
+	gss_buffer_t message_buffer, gss_buffer_t message_token, 
+	gss_qop_t * qop_state);
+
+extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE;
\ No newline at end of file

dh.c

@@ -212,14 +212,15 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
 /* diffie-hellman-groupN-sha1 */
 
 int
-dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub)
+dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *dh_pub)
 {
 	int i;
 	int n = BN_num_bits(dh_pub);
 	int bits_set = 0;
 	BIGNUM *tmp;
+	const BIGNUM *p;
 
-	if (dh_pub->neg) {
+	if (BN_is_negative(dh_pub)) {
 		logit("invalid public DH value: negative");
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -232,7 +233,8 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub)
 		error("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
 		return 0;
 	}
-	if (!BN_sub(tmp, dh->p, BN_value_one()) ||
+	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, NULL);
+	if (!BN_sub(tmp, p, BN_value_one()) ||
 	    BN_cmp(dh_pub, tmp) != -1) {		/* pub_exp > p-2 */
 		BN_clear_free(tmp);
 		logit("invalid public DH value: >= p-1");
@@ -243,14 +245,14 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub)
 	for (i = 0; i <= n; i++)
 		if (BN_is_bit_set(dh_pub, i))
 			bits_set++;
-	debug2("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p));
+	debug2("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(p));
 
 	/*
 	 * if g==2 and bits_set==1 then computing log_g(dh_pub) is trivial
 	 */
 	if (bits_set < 4) {
 		logit("invalid public DH value (%d/%d)",
-		   bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p));
+		   bits_set, BN_num_bits(p));
 		return 0;
 	}
 	return 1;
@@ -260,9 +262,11 @@ int
 dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
 {
 	int pbits;
+	const BIGNUM *p, *pub_key;
 
-	if (need < 0 || dh->p == NULL ||
-	    (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh->p)) <= 0 ||
+	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, NULL);
+	if (need < 0 || p == NULL ||
+	    (pbits = BN_num_bits(p)) <= 0 ||
 	    need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need > pbits)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 	if (need < 256)
@@ -271,10 +275,11 @@ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
 	 * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)),
 	 * so double requested need here.
 	 */
-	dh->length = MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1);
-	if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0 ||
-	    !dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh->pub_key)) {
-		BN_clear_free(dh->priv_key);
+	DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1));
+	if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key)) {
 		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 	}
 	return 0;
@@ -284,15 +289,22 @@ DH *
 dh_new_group_asc(const char *gen, const char *modulus)
 {
 	DH *dh;
-
-	if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
-		return NULL;
-	if (BN_hex2bn(&dh->p, modulus) == 0 ||
-	    BN_hex2bn(&dh->g, gen) == 0) {
+	BIGNUM *p, *g;
+
+	if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	if (BN_hex2bn(&p, modulus) == 0 ||
+	    BN_hex2bn(&g, gen) == 0 ||
+	    DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g) == 0)
+		goto err;
+	return (dh);
+err:
 	DH_free(dh);
+	BN_free(p);
+	BN_free(g);
 	return NULL;
-	}
-	return (dh);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -307,8 +319,7 @@ dh_new_group(BIGNUM *gen, BIGNUM *modulus)
 
 	if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
 		return NULL;
-	dh->p = modulus;
-	dh->g = gen;
+	DH_set0_pqg(dh, modulus, NULL, gen);
 
 	return (dh);
 }

dh.h

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group18(void);
 DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
 
 int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
-int	 dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *);
+int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
 
 u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
 

digest-openssl.c

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
 
 struct ssh_digest_ctx {
 	int alg;
-	EVP_MD_CTX mdctx;
+	EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
 };
 
 struct ssh_digest {
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ ssh_digest_bytes(int alg)
 size_t
 ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
 {
-	return EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(&ctx->mdctx);
+	return EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(ctx->mdctx);
 }
 
 struct ssh_digest_ctx *
@@ -119,8 +119,9 @@ ssh_digest_start(int alg)
 	if (digest == NULL || ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL))
 		return NULL;
 	ret->alg = alg;
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ret->mdctx);
-	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ret->mdctx, digest->mdfunc(), NULL) != 1) {
+	ret->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+	if (ret->mdctx == NULL ||
+	    EVP_DigestInit_ex(ret->mdctx, digest->mdfunc(), NULL) != 1) {
 		free(ret);
 		return NULL;
 	}
@@ -133,7 +134,7 @@ ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to)
 	if (from->alg != to->alg)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 	/* we have bcopy-style order while openssl has memcpy-style */
-	if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&to->mdctx, &from->mdctx))
+	if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(to->mdctx, from->mdctx))
 		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to)
 int
 ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
 {
-	if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->mdctx, m, mlen) != 1)
+	if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->mdctx, m, mlen) != 1)
 		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -162,7 +163,7 @@ ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 	if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-	if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->mdctx, d, &l) != 1)
+	if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->mdctx, d, &l) != 1)
 		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 	if (l != digest->digest_len) /* sanity */
 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
@@ -173,7 +174,7 @@ void
 ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	if (ctx != NULL) {
-		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->mdctx);
+		EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
 		explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
 		free(ctx);
 	}

gss-serv.c

@@ -57,12 +57,12 @@ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
 ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
     { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
 
-#ifdef KRB5
+#if defined(KRB5) || defined (SSPI)
 extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
 #endif
 
 ssh_gssapi_mech* supported_mechs[]= {
-#ifdef KRB5
+#if defined(KRB5) || defined (SSPI)
 	&gssapi_kerberos_mech,
 #endif
 	&gssapi_null_mech,

includes.h

@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@
 
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 #include <openssl/opensslv.h> /* For OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+#include "libcrypto-compat.h"
 #endif
 
 #include "defines.h"

kexdhc.c

@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ kexdh_client(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
 	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
 	int r;
+	const BIGNUM *pub_key;
 
 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
 	switch (kex->kex_type) {
@@ -81,21 +82,27 @@ kexdh_client(struct ssh *ssh)
 		goto out;
 	}
 	debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
-	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 ||
+	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
 	DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
 	fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
-	BN_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh->pub_key);
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key);
 	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
 #endif
 	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY");
 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, &input_kex_dh);
 	r = 0;
  out:
+	if (r != 0) {
+		DH_free(kex->dh);
+		kex->dh = NULL;
+	}
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -110,6 +117,7 @@ input_kex_dh(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
 	size_t klen = 0, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
 	int kout, r;
+	const BIGNUM *pub_key;
 
 	if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -169,6 +177,7 @@ input_kex_dh(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 #endif
 
 	/* calc and verify H */
+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
 	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
 	if ((r = kex_dh_hash(
 	    kex->hash_alg,
@@ -177,7 +186,7 @@ input_kex_dh(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
 	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
 	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
-	    kex->dh->pub_key,
+	    pub_key,
 	    dh_server_pub,
 	    shared_secret,
 	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)

kexdhs.c

@@ -87,6 +87,10 @@ kexdh_server(struct ssh *ssh)
 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, &input_kex_dh_init);
 	r = 0;
  out:
+	if (r != 0) {
+		DH_free(kex->dh);
+		kex->dh = NULL;
+	}
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -102,6 +106,7 @@ input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	size_t sbloblen, slen;
 	size_t klen = 0, hashlen;
 	int kout, r;
+	const BIGNUM *pub_key;
 
 	if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
 	    kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
@@ -164,6 +169,7 @@ input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		goto out;
 	/* calc H */
 	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
 	if ((r = kex_dh_hash(
 	    kex->hash_alg,
 	    kex->client_version_string,
@@ -172,7 +178,7 @@ input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
 	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
 	    dh_client_pub,
-	    kex->dh->pub_key,
+	    pub_key,
 	    shared_secret,
 	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
 		goto out;
@@ -198,7 +204,7 @@ input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 ||	/* f */
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||	/* f */
 	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
 		goto out;

kexgexc.c

@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
 	BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL;
 	int r, bits;
+	const BIGNUM *pub_key;
 
 	debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP");
 
@@ -119,26 +120,30 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
 
 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
-	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 ||
+	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT sent");
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
 	DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
 	fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
-	BN_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh->pub_key);
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key);
 	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
 #endif
 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, NULL);
 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, &input_kex_dh_gex_reply);
 	r = 0;
 out:
-	if (p)
 	BN_clear_free(p);
-	if (g)
 	BN_clear_free(g);
+	if (r != 0) {
+		DH_free(kex->dh);
+		kex->dh = NULL;
+	}
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -153,6 +158,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
 	size_t klen = 0, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
 	int kout, r;
+	const BIGNUM *p, *g, *pub_key;
 
 	debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY");
 	if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
@@ -219,6 +225,8 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		kex->min = kex->max = -1;
 
 	/* calc and verify H */
+	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, NULL, &g);
+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
 	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
 	if ((r = kexgex_hash(
 	    kex->hash_alg,
@@ -228,8 +236,8 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
 	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
 	    kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max,
-	    kex->dh->p, kex->dh->g,
-	    kex->dh->pub_key,
+	    p, g,
+	    pub_key,
 	    dh_server_pub,
 	    shared_secret,
 	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)

kexgexs.c

@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
 	int r;
 	u_int min = 0, max = 0, nbits = 0;
+	const BIGNUM *p, *g;
 
 	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received");
 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 ||
@@ -102,9 +103,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		goto out;
 	}
 	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP sent");
+	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, NULL, &g);
 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->p)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->g)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, p)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, g)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -116,6 +118,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, &input_kex_dh_gex_init);
 	r = 0;
  out:
+	if (r != 0) {
+		DH_free(kex->dh);
+		kex->dh = NULL;
+	}
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -131,6 +137,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	size_t sbloblen, slen;
 	size_t klen = 0, hashlen;
 	int kout, r;
+	const BIGNUM *p, *g, *pub_key;
 
 	if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
 	    kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
@@ -193,6 +200,8 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		goto out;
 	/* calc H */
 	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, NULL, &g);
+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
 	if ((r = kexgex_hash(
 	    kex->hash_alg,
 	    kex->client_version_string,
@@ -201,9 +210,9 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
 	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
 	    kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max,
-	    kex->dh->p, kex->dh->g,
+	    p, g,
 	    dh_client_pub,
-	    kex->dh->pub_key,
+	    pub_key,
 	    shared_secret,
 	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
 		goto out;
@@ -229,7 +238,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 ||     /* f */
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||     /* f */
 	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
 		goto out;

monitor.c

@@ -581,9 +581,12 @@ mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
 		return (0);
 	} else {
 		/* Send first bignum */
+		const BIGNUM *p, *g;
+
+		DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
 		buffer_put_char(m, 1);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
+		buffer_put_bignum2(m, g);
 
 		DH_free(dh);
 	}

openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c

@@ -70,12 +70,19 @@ ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver)
 void
 ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
 	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
 
 	/* Enable use of crypto hardware */
 	ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10001000L
 	ENGINE_register_all_complete();
+#endif
 	OPENSSL_config(NULL);
+#else
+	OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS |
+	    OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL);
+#endif
 }
 #endif
 

patches/0002-cygwin-252-nxclient-w32-nxcomp.patch

+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 7470dfc..1f0934b 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ AC_SUBST([TEST_SHELL], [sh])
+ AC_SUBST(NXCOMPINC)
+ AC_SUBST(NXCOMPLIBS)
+ 
+-NXCOMPINC="-I$includedir/nx"
+-NXCOMPLIBS="-lXcomp"
++NXCOMPINC="-I../nxcomp"
++NXCOMPLIBS="-L../nxcomp -lXcomp -lstdc++ -lpng -ljpeg -lz"
+ 
+ dnl select manpage formatter
+ if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then
+@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ case "$host" in
+ *-*-cygwin*)
+ 	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+ 	dont_check_for_resolv=1
+-	LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textmode.o /usr/lib/libminires.a"
++	LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textmode.o"
+ 	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CYGWIN], [1], [Define if you are on Cygwin])
+ 	AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES], [1], [Use PIPES instead of a socketpair()])
+ 	AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1],

regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
 	struct sshbuf *buf, *pw;
 	BIGNUM *a, *b, *c;
 	char *cp;
+	const BIGNUM *n, *p, *q, *g, *pub_key, *priv_key;
 
 	TEST_START("load passphrase");
 	pw = load_text_file("pw");
@@ -58,7 +59,8 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
 	sshbuf_free(buf);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
 	a = load_bignum("rsa1_1.param.n");
-	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->n, a);
+	RSA_get0_key(k1->rsa, &n, NULL, NULL);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(n, a);
 	BN_free(a);
 	TEST_DONE();
 
@@ -109,9 +111,11 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
 	a = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.n");
 	b = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.p");
 	c = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.q");
-	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->n, a);
-	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->p, b);
-	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->q, c);
+	RSA_get0_key(k1->rsa, &n, NULL, NULL);
+	RSA_get0_factors(k1->rsa, &p, &q);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(n, a);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(p, b);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(q, c);
 	BN_free(a);
 	BN_free(b);
 	BN_free(c);
@@ -200,9 +204,11 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
 	a = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.g");
 	b = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.priv");
 	c = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.pub");
-	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->g, a);
-	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, b);
-	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->pub_key, c);
+	DSA_get0_pqg(k1->dsa, NULL, NULL, &g);
+	DSA_get0_key(k1->dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(g, a);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(priv_key, b);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(pub_key, c);
 	BN_free(a);
 	BN_free(b);
 	BN_free(c);

regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c

@@ -197,9 +197,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
 	k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL);
 	sshkey_free(k1);
 	TEST_DONE();
 
@@ -207,9 +204,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
 	k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL);
 	sshkey_free(k1);
 	TEST_DONE();
 
@@ -217,8 +211,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
 	k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_DSA);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL);
 	sshkey_free(k1);
 	TEST_DONE();
 
@@ -244,9 +236,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
 	k1 = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->p, NULL);
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_add_private(k1), 0);
 	sshkey_free(k1);
 	TEST_DONE();
@@ -255,8 +244,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
 	k1 = sshkey_new_private(KEY_DSA);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL);
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_add_private(k1), 0);
 	sshkey_free(k1);
 	TEST_DONE();
@@ -295,18 +282,13 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &kr), 0);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, NULL);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->n, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->e, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->p, NULL);
-	ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bits(kr->rsa->n), 1024);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(RSA_bits(kr->rsa), 1024);
 	TEST_DONE();
 
 	TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA");
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &kd), 0);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, NULL);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa->g, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa->priv_key, NULL);
 	TEST_DONE();
 
 #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
@@ -333,9 +315,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, k1);
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_RSA);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL);
 	TEST_DONE();
 
 	TEST_START("equal KEY_RSA/demoted KEY_RSA");
@@ -349,8 +328,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, k1);
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_DSA);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL);
-	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL);
 	TEST_DONE();
 
 	TEST_START("equal KEY_DSA/demoted KEY_DSA");

rsa.c

@@ -76,11 +76,14 @@ rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
 {
 	u_char *inbuf = NULL, *outbuf = NULL;
 	int len, ilen, olen, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	const BIGNUM *e, *n;
 
-	if (BN_num_bits(key->e) < 2 || !BN_is_odd(key->e))
+	RSA_get0_key(key, &n, &e, NULL);
+
+	if (BN_num_bits(e) < 2 || !BN_is_odd(e))
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 
-	olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n);
+	olen = BN_num_bytes(n);
 	if ((outbuf = malloc(olen)) == NULL) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
@@ -122,8 +125,11 @@ rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
 {
 	u_char *inbuf = NULL, *outbuf = NULL;
 	int len, ilen, olen, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	const BIGNUM *n;
+
+	RSA_get0_key(key, &n, NULL, NULL);
 
-	olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n);
+	olen = BN_num_bytes(n);
 	if ((outbuf = malloc(olen)) == NULL) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
@@ -157,31 +163,42 @@ rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
 	return r;
 }
 
-/* calculate p-1 and q-1 */
+/* calculate d mod p-1 and d mod q-1 */
 int
-rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *rsa)
+rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *iqmp)
 {
 	BIGNUM *aux = NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 	int r;
+	const BIGNUM *p, *q, *d;
+	BIGNUM *dmp1 = NULL, *dmq1 = NULL;
+
+	RSA_get0_factors(rsa, &p, &q);
+	RSA_get0_key(rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
 
-	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-	if ((aux = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (aux = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if ((BN_sub(aux, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) == 0) ||
-	    (BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, aux, ctx) == 0) ||
-	    (BN_sub(aux, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) == 0) ||
-	    (BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, aux, ctx) == 0)) {
+	if ((BN_sub(aux, q, BN_value_one()) == 0) ||
+	    (BN_mod(dmq1, d, aux, ctx) == 0) ||
+	    (BN_sub(aux, p, BN_value_one()) == 0) ||
+	    (BN_mod(dmp1, d, aux, ctx) == 0) ||
+	    (RSA_set0_crt_params(rsa, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp) == 0)) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
+	dmp1 = NULL;
+	dmq1 = NULL;
 	r = 0;
  out:
 	BN_clear_free(aux);
+	BN_clear_free(dmp1);
+	BN_clear_free(dmq1);
 	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
 	return r;
 }

rsa.h

@@ -21,6 +21,6 @@
 
 int	 rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *);
 int	 rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *);
-int	 rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *);
+int	 rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *, BIGNUM *);
 
 #endif				/* RSA_H */

ssh-agent.c

@@ -258,12 +258,12 @@ process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
 	TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &tab->idlist, next) {
 		if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
+			const BIGNUM *r_n, *r_e;
+			RSA_get0_key(id->key->rsa, &r_n, &r_e, NULL);
 			if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg,
-			    BN_num_bits(id->key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
-			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg,
-			    id->key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg,
-			    id->key->rsa->n)) != 0)
+			    BN_num_bits(r_n))) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, r_e)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, r_n)) != 0)
 				fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
 				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
 #endif
@@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e)
 	struct sshbuf *msg;
 	struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
 	struct sshkey *key;
+	BIGNUM *r_n = NULL, *r_e = NULL;
 
 	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
@@ -310,11 +311,16 @@ process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e)
 	if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
 
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignored */
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, challenge)))
+	if ((r_n = BN_new()) == NULL || (r_e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignored */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, r_e)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, r_n)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, challenge)) ||
+	    RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, r_n, r_e, NULL) == 0) {
+		BN_free(r_n);
+		BN_free(r_e);
 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	}
 
 	/* Only protocol 1.1 is supported */
 	if (sshbuf_len(e->request) == 0)
@@ -450,6 +456,7 @@ process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
 	u_char *blob;
 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
 	u_int bits;
+	BIGNUM *r_n = NULL, *r_e = NULL;
 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
 
 	switch (version) {
@@ -459,10 +466,15 @@ process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
 			error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__);
 			return;
 		}
-		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &bits)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->n)) != 0)
+		if ((r_n = BN_new()) == NULL || (r_e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &bits)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, r_e)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, r_n)) != 0 ||
+		    RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, r_n, r_e, NULL) == 0) {
+			BN_free(r_n);
+			BN_free(r_e);
 			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		}
 
 		if (bits != sshkey_size(key))
 			logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: "
@@ -565,23 +577,46 @@ agent_decode_rsa1(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshkey **kp)
 {
 	struct sshkey *k = NULL;
 	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL,
+	    *iqmp = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL;
 
 	*kp = NULL;
 	if ((k = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 
-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, NULL)) != 0 ||		/* ignored */
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
+	if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL || (e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (d = BN_new()) == NULL || (iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (q = BN_new()) == NULL || (p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, NULL)) != 0 ||		/* ignored */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, n)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, e)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, d)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, iqmp)) != 0 ||
 	    /* SSH1 and SSL have p and q swapped */
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->q)) != 0 ||	/* p */
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->p)) != 0) 	/* q */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, q)) != 0 ||	/* p */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, p)) != 0 || 	/* q */
+	    RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, n, e, d) == 0) {
+		BN_free(n);
+		BN_free(e);
+		BN_free(d);
+		BN_free(p);
+		BN_free(q);
+		BN_free(iqmp);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (RSA_set0_factors(k->rsa, p, q) == 0) {
+		BN_free(p);
+		BN_free(q);
+		BN_free(iqmp);
 		goto out;
+	}
+	if (RSA_set0_crt_params(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, iqmp) == 0) {
+		BN_free(iqmp);
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	/* Generate additional parameters */
-	if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0)
+	if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa, NULL)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 	/* enable blinding */
 	if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) {

ssh-dss.c

@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 	size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	const BIGNUM *r, *s;
 
 	if (lenp != NULL)
 		*lenp = 0;
@@ -76,15 +77,16 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig->r);
-	slen = BN_num_bytes(sig->s);
+	DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s);
+	rlen = BN_num_bytes(r);
+	slen = BN_num_bytes(s);
 	if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	explicit_bzero(sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN);
-	BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen);
-	BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - slen);
+	BN_bn2bin(r, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen);
+	BN_bn2bin(s, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - slen);
 
 	if (compat & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) {
 		if (sigp != NULL) {
@@ -137,6 +139,7 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
 	char *ktype = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
 
 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
@@ -177,16 +180,19 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 
 	/* parse signature */
 	if ((sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (sig->r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (sig->s = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+	    (r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (s = BN_new()) == NULL) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->r) == NULL) ||
-	    (BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->s) == NULL)) {
+	if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, r) == NULL) ||
+	    (BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, s) == NULL) ||
+	    (DSA_SIG_set0(sig, r, s) == 0)) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
+	r = NULL;
+	s = NULL;
 
 	/* sha1 the data */
 	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
@@ -207,7 +213,8 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 
  out:
 	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-	if (sig != NULL)
+	BN_free(r);
+	BN_free(s);
 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
 	sshbuf_free(b);
 	free(ktype);

ssh-ecdsa.c

@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 	size_t len, dlen;
 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	const BIGNUM *r, *s;
 
 	if (lenp != NULL)
 		*lenp = 0;
@@ -80,8 +81,9 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig->r)) != 0 ||
-	    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig->s)) != 0)
+	ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s);
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, r)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, s)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 	if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key))) != 0 ||
 	    (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, bb)) != 0)
@@ -119,6 +121,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
 	char *ktype = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
 
 	if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
@@ -147,15 +150,23 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 	}
 
 	/* parse signature */
-	if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
+	if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (s = BN_new()) == NULL) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, sig->r) != 0 ||
-	    sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, sig->s) != 0) {
+	if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, r) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, s) != 0) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
 		goto out;
 	}
+	if (ECDSA_SIG_set0(sig, r, s) == 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	r = NULL;
+	s = NULL;
 	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
 		goto out;
@@ -180,7 +191,8 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
 	sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
 	sshbuf_free(b);
-	if (sig != NULL)
+	BN_free(r);
+	BN_free(s);
 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
 	free(ktype);
 	return ret;

ssh-gss.h

@@ -28,6 +28,14 @@
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 
+#ifdef SSPI
+#include "contrib/win32/win32compat/inc/gssapi.h"
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+#endif
+
 #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
 #include <gssapi.h>
 #elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)

ssh-keygen.c

@@ -495,14 +495,37 @@ do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(u_char *blob, u_int blen)
 	free(type);
 
 	switch (key->type) {
-	case KEY_DSA:
-		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->p);
-		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->g);
-		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->q);
-		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->pub_key);
-		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->priv_key);
-		break;
-	case KEY_RSA:
+	case KEY_DSA: {
+			BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *q = NULL, *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+
+			if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (q = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+				fatal("BN_new() failed");
+			buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, p);
+			buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, g);
+			buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, q);
+			buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, pub_key);
+			buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, priv_key);
+			if (DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, p, q, g) == 0 ||
+			    DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, pub_key, priv_key) == 0) {
+				fatal("failed to set DSA key");
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+	case KEY_RSA: {
+			BIGNUM *bn_e = NULL, *bn_d = NULL, *bn_n = NULL, *bn_iqmp = NULL, *bn_p = NULL, *bn_q = NULL;
+
+			if ((bn_e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (bn_d = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (bn_n = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (bn_iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (bn_p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (bn_q = BN_new()) == NULL)
+				fatal("BN_new() failed");
+
 			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e1)) != 0 ||
 			    (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e2)) != 0) ||
 			    (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e3)) != 0))
@@ -517,18 +540,22 @@ do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(u_char *blob, u_int blen)
 				e += e3;
 				debug("e %lx", e);
 			}
-		if (!BN_set_word(key->rsa->e, e)) {
+			if (!BN_set_word(bn_e, e)) {
 				sshbuf_free(b);
 				sshkey_free(key);
 				return NULL;
 			}
-		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->d);
-		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->n);
-		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->iqmp);
-		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->q);
-		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->p);
-		if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(key->rsa)) != 0)
+			buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, bn_d);
+			buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, bn_n);
+			buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, bn_iqmp);
+			buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, bn_q);
+			buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, bn_p);
+			if (RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, bn_n, bn_e, bn_d) == 0 ||
+			    RSA_set0_factors(key->rsa, bn_p, bn_q) == 0)
+				fatal("Failed to set RSA parameters");
+			if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(key->rsa, bn_iqmp)) != 0)
 				fatal("generate RSA parameters failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+		}
 		break;
 	}
 	rlen = sshbuf_len(b);
@@ -636,7 +663,7 @@ do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k, int *private)
 		    identity_file);
 	}
 	fclose(fp);
-	switch (EVP_PKEY_type(pubkey->type)) {
+	switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)) {
 	case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
 		if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
 			fatal("sshkey_new failed");
@@ -660,7 +687,7 @@ do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k, int *private)
 #endif
 	default:
 		fatal("%s: unsupported pubkey type %d", __func__,
-		    EVP_PKEY_type(pubkey->type));
+		    EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey));
 	}
 	EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
 	return;
@@ -1702,6 +1729,7 @@ do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv)
 #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
 	pkcs11_terminate();
 #endif
+	free(ca);
 	exit(0);
 }
 

ssh-keyscan.c

@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ keygrab_ssh1(con *c)
 	static struct sshbuf *msg;
 	int r;
 	u_char type;
+	BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL;
 
 	if (rsa == NULL) {
 		if ((rsa = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) {
@@ -213,16 +214,20 @@ keygrab_ssh1(con *c)
 		sshbuf_reset(msg);
 		return NULL;
 	}
-	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(msg, 8)) != 0 || /* cookie */
+	if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL || (e = BN_new()) == NULL || 
+	    (r = sshbuf_consume(msg, 8)) != 0 || /* cookie */
 	    /* server key */
 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
 	    /* host key */
 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, rsa->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, rsa->rsa->n)) != 0) {
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, e)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, n)) != 0 ||
+	    RSA_set0_key(rsa->rsa, n, e, NULL) == 0) {
  buf_err:
+		BN_free(n);
+		BN_free(e);
 		error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 		sshbuf_reset(msg);
 		return NULL;

ssh-pkcs11-client.c

@@ -143,12 +143,14 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
 static int
 wrap_key(RSA *rsa)
 {
-	static RSA_METHOD helper_rsa;
+	static RSA_METHOD *helper_rsa;
 
-	memcpy(&helper_rsa, RSA_get_default_method(), sizeof(helper_rsa));
-	helper_rsa.name = "ssh-pkcs11-helper";
-	helper_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt;
-	RSA_set_method(rsa, &helper_rsa);
+	if (helper_rsa == NULL) {
+		helper_rsa = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method());
+		RSA_meth_set1_name(helper_rsa, "ssh-pkcs11-helper");
+		RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(helper_rsa, pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt);
+	}
+	RSA_set_method(rsa, helper_rsa);
 	return (0);
 }
 

ssh-pkcs11.c

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ struct pkcs11_key {
 	struct pkcs11_provider	*provider;
 	CK_ULONG		slotidx;
 	int			(*orig_finish)(RSA *rsa);
-	RSA_METHOD		rsa_method;
+	RSA_METHOD		*rsa_method;
 	char			*keyid;
 	int			keyid_len;
 };
@@ -326,13 +326,21 @@ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
 		k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len);
 		memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
 	}
-	k11->orig_finish = def->finish;
-	memcpy(&k11->rsa_method, def, sizeof(k11->rsa_method));
-	k11->rsa_method.name = "pkcs11";
-	k11->rsa_method.rsa_priv_enc = pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt;
-	k11->rsa_method.rsa_priv_dec = pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt;
-	k11->rsa_method.finish = pkcs11_rsa_finish;
-	RSA_set_method(rsa, &k11->rsa_method);
+	k11->orig_finish = RSA_meth_get_finish(def);
+	if ((k11->rsa_method = RSA_meth_dup(def)) == NULL ||
+	    RSA_meth_set1_name(k11->rsa_method, "pkcs11") == 0 ||
+	    RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(k11->rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt) == 0 ||
+	    RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(k11->rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt) == 0 ||
+	    RSA_meth_set_finish(k11->rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_finish) == 0) {
+		RSA_meth_free(k11->rsa_method);
+		k11->rsa_method = NULL;
+		pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider);
+		free(k11->keyid);
+		free(k11);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	RSA_set_method(rsa, k11->rsa_method);
 	RSA_set_app_data(rsa, k11);
 	return (0);
 }
@@ -460,6 +468,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
 	CK_ULONG		nfound;
 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	session;
 	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f;
+	const BIGNUM		*n, *e;
 
 	f = p->function_list;
 	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
@@ -512,10 +521,14 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
 			if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
 				error("RSA_new failed");
 			} else {
-				rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(attribs[1].pValue,
+				BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e;
+
+				rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(attribs[1].pValue,
 				    attribs[1].ulValueLen, NULL);
-				rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(attribs[2].pValue,
+				rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(attribs[2].pValue,
 				    attribs[2].ulValueLen, NULL);
+				if (RSA_set0_key(rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL) == 0)
+					error("RSA_set0_key failed");
 			}
 		} else {
 			cp = attribs[2].pValue;
@@ -525,17 +538,18 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
 			    == NULL) {
 				error("d2i_X509 failed");
 			} else if ((evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509)) == NULL ||
-			    evp->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA ||
-			    evp->pkey.rsa == NULL) {
+			    EVP_PKEY_id(evp) != EVP_PKEY_RSA ||
+			    EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp) == NULL) {
 				debug("X509_get_pubkey failed or no rsa");
-			} else if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup(evp->pkey.rsa))
+			} else if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp)))
 			    == NULL) {
 				error("RSAPublicKey_dup");
 			}
 			if (x509)
 				X509_free(x509);
 		}
-		if (rsa && rsa->n && rsa->e &&
+		RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
+		if (rsa && n && e &&
 		    pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], rsa) == 0) {
 			key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
 			key->rsa = rsa;

ssh-rsa.c

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 		hash_alg = rsa_hash_alg_from_ident(alg_ident);
 	if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 ||
 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
-	    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+	    RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 	slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
 	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 
 	if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL ||
 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
-	    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
+	    RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 

sshconnect.c

@@ -1752,6 +1752,7 @@ ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
 	char *server_user, *local_user;
 
 	local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+	free(pw);
 	server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user;
 
 	/* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */

sshconnect1.c

@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ try_agent_authentication(void)
 	u_char response[16];
 	size_t i;
 	BIGNUM *challenge;
+	const BIGNUM *n;
 	struct ssh_identitylist *idlist = NULL;
 
 	/* Get connection to the agent. */
@@ -96,8 +97,9 @@ try_agent_authentication(void)
 		    idlist->comments[i]);
 
 		/* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
+		RSA_get0_key(idlist->keys[i]->rsa, &n, NULL, NULL);
 		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
-		packet_put_bignum(idlist->keys[i]->rsa->n);
+		packet_put_bignum((BIGNUM *)n);
 		packet_send();
 		packet_write_wait();
 
@@ -220,6 +222,7 @@ static int
 try_rsa_authentication(int idx)
 {
 	BIGNUM *challenge;
+	const BIGNUM *n;
 	Key *public, *private;
 	char buf[300], *passphrase = NULL, *comment, *authfile;
 	int i, perm_ok = 1, type, quit;
@@ -231,8 +234,9 @@ try_rsa_authentication(int idx)
 	debug("Trying RSA authentication with key '%.100s'", comment);
 
 	/* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
+	RSA_get0_key(public->rsa, &n, NULL, NULL);
 	packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
-	packet_put_bignum(public->rsa->n);
+	packet_put_bignum((BIGNUM *)n);
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();
 
@@ -348,15 +352,17 @@ try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(const char *local_user, Key * host_key)
 {
 	int type;
 	BIGNUM *challenge;
+	const BIGNUM *n, *e;
 
 	debug("Trying rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication.");
 
 	/* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
+	RSA_get0_key(host_key->rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
 	packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
 	packet_put_cstring(local_user);
-	packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n));
-	packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->e);
-	packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->n);
+	packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(n));
+	packet_put_bignum((BIGNUM *)e);
+	packet_put_bignum((BIGNUM *)n);
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();
 
@@ -502,6 +508,8 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 {
 	int i;
 	BIGNUM *key;
+	BIGNUM *server_n = NULL, *server_e = NULL,
+	    *host_n = NULL, *host_e = NULL;
 	Key *host_key, *server_key;
 	int bits, rbits;
 	int ssh_cipher_default = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
@@ -523,10 +531,14 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 	if ((server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: key_new(KEY_RSA1) failed", __func__);
 	bits = packet_get_int();
-	packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->e);
-	packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->n);
-
-	rbits = BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n);
+	if ((server_e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (server_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("BN_new() failed");
+	packet_get_bignum(server_e);
+	packet_get_bignum(server_n);
+	RSA_set0_key(server_key->rsa, server_n, server_e, NULL);
+
+	rbits = BN_num_bits(server_n);
 	if (bits != rbits) {
 		logit("Warning: Server lies about size of server public key: "
 		    "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits);
@@ -536,10 +548,14 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 	if ((host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: key_new(KEY_RSA1) failed", __func__);
 	bits = packet_get_int();
-	packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->e);
-	packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->n);
-
-	rbits = BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n);
+	if ((host_e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (host_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("BN_new() failed");
+	packet_get_bignum(host_e);
+	packet_get_bignum(host_n);
+	RSA_set0_key(host_key->rsa, host_n, host_e, NULL);
+
+	rbits = BN_num_bits(host_n);
 	if (bits != rbits) {
 		logit("Warning: Server lies about size of server host key: "
 		    "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits);
@@ -555,14 +571,14 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 	packet_check_eom();
 
 	debug("Received server public key (%d bits) and host key (%d bits).",
-	    BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n));
+	    BN_num_bits(server_n), BN_num_bits(host_n));
 
 	if (verify_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key) == -1)
 		fatal("Host key verification failed.");
 
 	client_flags = SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER | SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN;
 
-	derive_ssh1_session_id(host_key->rsa->n, server_key->rsa->n, cookie, session_id);
+	derive_ssh1_session_id(host_n, server_n, cookie, session_id);
 
 	/*
 	 * Generate an encryption key for the session.   The key is a 256 bit
@@ -597,14 +613,14 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 	 * Encrypt the integer using the public key and host key of the
 	 * server (key with smaller modulus first).
 	 */
-	if (BN_cmp(server_key->rsa->n, host_key->rsa->n) < 0) {
+	if (BN_cmp(server_n, host_n) < 0) {
 		/* Public key has smaller modulus. */
-		if (BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n) <
-		    BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+		if (BN_num_bits(host_n) <
+		    BN_num_bits(server_n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
 			fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: host_key %d < server_key %d + "
 			    "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
-			    BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n),
-			    BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n),
+			    BN_num_bits(host_n),
+			    BN_num_bits(server_n),
 			    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
 		}
 		if (rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, server_key->rsa) != 0 ||
@@ -612,12 +628,12 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 			fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt failed", __func__);
 	} else {
 		/* Host key has smaller modulus (or they are equal). */
-		if (BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n) <
-		    BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+		if (BN_num_bits(server_n) <
+		    BN_num_bits(host_n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
 			fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: server_key %d < host_key %d + "
 			    "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
-			    BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n),
-			    BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n),
+			    BN_num_bits(server_n),
+			    BN_num_bits(host_n),
 			    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
 		}
 		if (rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key->rsa) != 0 ||

sshconnect2.c

@@ -257,6 +257,7 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();
 #endif
+	/* XXX free myproposal ?? */
 }
 
 /*