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Commit b1b8ac2b authored by Pavel Vainerman's avatar Pavel Vainerman
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initial commit base on openssh V_7_5

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321065a95a7ccebdd5fd08482a1e19afbf524e35 Update DH groups
d4f699a421504df35254cf1c6f1a7c304fb907ca Remove 1k bit groups
aafe246655b53b52bc32c8a24002bc262f4230f7 Remove intermediate moduli
8fa9cd1dee3c3339ae329cf20fb591db6d605120 put back SSH1 for 6.9
f31327a48dd4103333cc53315ec53fe65ed8a17a Generate new moduli
edbfde98c40007b7752a4ac106095e060c25c1ef Regen moduli
052fd565e3ff2d8cec3bc957d1788f50c827f8e2 Switch to tame-based sandbox
7cf73737f357492776223da1c09179fa6ba74660 Remove moduli <2k
180d84674be1344e45a63990d60349988187c1ae Update moduli
f6ae971186ba68d066cd102e57d5b0b2c211a5ee systrace is dead.
96c5054e3e1f170c6276902d5bc65bb3b87a2603 remove DEBUGLIBS from Makefile
6da9a37f74aef9f9cc639004345ad893cad582d8 Update moduli file
77bcb50e47b68c7209c7f0a5a020d73761e5143b unset REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY
CREDITS 0 → 100644
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Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> - Creator of SSH
Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song - Creators of OpenSSH
Ahsan Rashid <arms@sco.com> - UnixWare long passwords
Alain St-Denis <Alain.St-Denis@ec.gc.ca> - Irix fix
Alexandre Oliva <oliva@lsd.ic.unicamp.br> - AIX fixes
Andre Lucas <andre@ae-35.com> - new login code, many fixes
Andreas Steinmetz <ast@domdv.de> - Shadow password expiry support
Andrew McGill <andrewm@datrix.co.za> - SCO fixes
Andrew Morgan <morgan@transmeta.com> - PAM bugfixes
Andrew Stribblehill <a.d.stribblehill@durham.ac.uk> - Bugfixes
Andy Sloane <andy@guildsoftware.com> - bugfixes
Aran Cox <acox@cv.telegroup.com> - SCO bugfixes
Arkadiusz Miskiewicz <misiek@pld.org.pl> - IPv6 compat fixes
Ben Lindstrom <mouring@eviladmin.org> - NeXT support
Ben Taylor <bent@clark.net> - Solaris debugging and fixes
Bratislav ILICH <bilic@zepter.ru> - Configure fix
Charles Levert <charles@comm.polymtl.ca> - SunOS 4 & bug fixes
Chip Salzenberg <chip@valinux.com> - Assorted patches
Chris Adams <cmadams@hiwaay.net> - OSF SIA support
Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com> - SuSE packaging
Chris, the Young One <cky@pobox.com> - Password auth fixes
Christos Zoulas <christos@zoulas.com> - Autoconf fixes
Chun-Chung Chen <cjj@u.washington.edu> - RPM fixes
Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com> - Cygwin support
Chad Mynhier <mynhier@interstel.net> - Solaris Process Contract support
Dan Brosemer <odin@linuxfreak.com> - Autoconf support, build fixes
Darren Hall <dhall@virage.org> - AIX patches
Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> - AIX BFF package scripts
David Agraz <dagraz@jahoopa.com> - Build fixes
David Del Piero <David.DelPiero@qed.qld.gov.au> - bug fixes
David Hesprich <darkgrue@gue-tech.org> - Configure fixes
David Rankin <drankin@bohemians.lexington.ky.us> - libwrap, AIX, NetBSD fixes
Dag-Erling Smrgrav <des at freebsd.org> - Challenge-Response PAM code.
Dhiraj Gulati <dgulati@sco.com> - UnixWare long passwords
Ed Eden <ede370@stl.rural.usda.gov> - configure fixes
Garrick James <garrick@james.net> - configure fixes
Gary E. Miller <gem@rellim.com> - SCO support
Ged Lodder <lodder@yacc.com.au> - HPUX fixes and enhancements
Gert Doering <gd@hilb1.medat.de> - bug and portability fixes
HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@unixuser.org> - Translations & doc fixes
Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@ecei.tohoku.ac.jp> - IPv6 and bug fixes
Hiroshi Takekawa <takekawa@sr3.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp> - Configure fixes
Holger Trapp <Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE> - KRB4/AFS config patch
IWAMURO Motonori <iwa@mmp.fujitsu.co.jp> - bugfixes
Jani Hakala <jahakala@cc.jyu.fi> - Patches
Jarno Huuskonen <jhuuskon@hytti.uku.fi> - Bugfixes
Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com> - Many patches
Jonchen (email unknown) - the original author of PAM support of SSH
Juergen Keil <jk@tools.de> - scp bugfixing
KAMAHARA Junzo <kamahara@cc.kshosen.ac.jp> - Configure fixes
Kees Cook <cook@cpoint.net> - scp fixes
Kenji Miyake <kenji@miyake.org> - Configure fixes
Kevin Cawlfield <cawlfiel@us.ibm.com> - AIX fixes.
Kevin O'Connor <kevin_oconnor@standardandpoors.com> - RSAless operation
Kevin Steves <stevesk@pobox.com> - HP support, bugfixes, improvements
Kiyokazu SUTO <suto@ks-and-ks.ne.jp> - Bugfixes
Larry Jones <larry.jones@sdrc.com> - Bugfixes
Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> - Bugfixes
Marc G. Fournier <marc.fournier@acadiau.ca> - Solaris patches
Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net> - bug fixes
Martin Johansson <fatbob@acc.umu.se> - Linux fixes
Mark D. Roth <roth+openssh@feep.net> - Features, bug fixes
Mark Miller <markm@swoon.net> - Bugfixes
Matt Richards <v2matt@btv.ibm.com> - AIX patches
Michael Steffens <michael_steffens at hp.com> - HP-UX fixes
Michael Stone <mstone@cs.loyola.edu> - Irix enhancements
Nakaji Hiroyuki <nakaji@tutrp.tut.ac.jp> - Sony News-OS patch
Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin.dahyabhai@pobox.com> - PAM environment patch
Nate Itkin <nitkin@europa.com> - SunOS 4.1.x fixes
Niels Kristian Bech Jensen <nkbj@image.dk> - Assorted patches
Pavel Kankovsky <peak@argo.troja.mff.cuni.cz> - Security fixes
Pavel Troller <patrol@omni.sinus.cz> - Bugfixes
Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi> - Bugfixes
Peter Kocks <peter.kocks@baygate.com> - Makefile fixes
Peter Stuge <stuge@cdy.org> - mdoc2man.awk script
Phil Hands <phil@hands.com> - Debian scripts, assorted patches
Phil Karn <karn@ka9q.ampr.org> - Autoconf fixes
Philippe WILLEM <Philippe.WILLEM@urssaf.fr> - Bugfixes
Phill Camp <P.S.S.Camp@ukc.ac.uk> - login code fix
Rip Loomis <loomisg@cist.saic.com> - Solaris package support, fixes
Robert Dahlem <Robert.Dahlem at siemens.com> - Reliant Unix fixes
Roumen Petrov <openssh@roumenpetrov.info> - Compile & configure fixes
SAKAI Kiyotaka <ksakai@kso.netwk.ntt-at.co.jp> - Multiple bugfixes
Simon Wilkinson <sxw@dcs.ed.ac.uk> - PAM fixes, Compat with MIT KrbV
Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> - many patches and technical assistance
Svante Signell <svante.signell@telia.com> - Bugfixes
Thomas Neumann <tom@smart.ruhr.de> - Shadow passwords
Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net> - Portability & SCO fixes
Tobias Oetiker <oetiker@ee.ethz.ch> - Bugfixes
Tom Bertelson's <tbert@abac.com> - AIX auth fixes
Tor-Ake Fransson <torake@hotmail.com> - AIX support
Tudor Bosman <tudorb@jm.nu> - MD5 password support
Udo Schweigert <ust@cert.siemens.de> - ReliantUNIX support
Wendy Palm <wendyp at cray.com> - Cray support.
Zack Weinberg <zack@wolery.cumb.org> - GNOME askpass enhancement
Apologies to anyone I have missed.
Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
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1. Prerequisites
----------------
A C compiler. Any C89 or better compiler should work. Where supported,
configure will attempt to enable the compiler's run-time integrity checking
options. Some notes about specific compilers:
- clang: -ftrapv and -sanitize=integer require the compiler-rt runtime
(CC=clang LDFLAGS=--rtlib=compiler-rt ./configure)
You will need working installations of Zlib and libcrypto (LibreSSL /
OpenSSL)
Zlib 1.1.4 or 1.2.1.2 or greater (earlier 1.2.x versions have problems):
http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
libcrypto (LibreSSL or OpenSSL >= 0.9.8f < 1.1.0)
LibreSSL http://www.libressl.org/ ; or
OpenSSL http://www.openssl.org/
LibreSSL/OpenSSL should be compiled as a position-independent library
(i.e. with -fPIC) otherwise OpenSSH will not be able to link with it.
If you must use a non-position-independent libcrypto, then you may need
to configure OpenSSH --without-pie. Note that because of API changes,
OpenSSL 1.1.x is not currently supported.
The remaining items are optional.
NB. If you operating system supports /dev/random, you should configure
libcrypto (LibreSSL/OpenSSL) to use it. OpenSSH relies on libcrypto's
direct support of /dev/random, or failing that, either prngd or egd
PRNGD:
If your system lacks kernel-based random collection, the use of Lutz
Jaenicke's PRNGd is recommended.
http://prngd.sourceforge.net/
EGD:
If the kernel lacks /dev/random the Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is
supported only if libcrypto supports it.
http://egd.sourceforge.net/
PAM:
OpenSSH can utilise Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) if your
system supports it. PAM is standard most Linux distributions, Solaris,
HP-UX 11, AIX >= 5.2, FreeBSD and NetBSD.
Information about the various PAM implementations are available:
Solaris PAM: http://www.sun.com/software/solaris/pam/
Linux PAM: http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/
OpenPAM: http://www.openpam.org/
If you wish to build the GNOME passphrase requester, you will need the GNOME
libraries and headers.
GNOME:
http://www.gnome.org/
Alternatively, Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com> has written an excellent X11
passphrase requester. This is maintained separately at:
http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/
S/Key Libraries:
If you wish to use --with-skey then you will need the library below
installed. No other S/Key library is currently known to be supported.
http://www.sparc.spb.su/solaris/skey/
LibEdit:
sftp supports command-line editing via NetBSD's libedit. If your platform
has it available natively you can use that, alternatively you might try
these multi-platform ports:
http://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/
http://sourceforge.net/projects/libedit/
LDNS:
LDNS is a DNS BSD-licensed resolver library which supports DNSSEC.
http://nlnetlabs.nl/projects/ldns/
Autoconf:
If you modify configure.ac or configure doesn't exist (eg if you checked
the code out of CVS yourself) then you will need autoconf-2.69 to rebuild
the automatically generated files by running "autoreconf". Earlier
versions may also work but this is not guaranteed.
http://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/
Basic Security Module (BSM):
Native BSM support is know to exist in Solaris from at least 2.5.1,
FreeBSD 6.1 and OS X. Alternatively, you may use the OpenBSM
implementation (http://www.openbsm.org).
2. Building / Installation
--------------------------
To install OpenSSH with default options:
./configure
make
make install
This will install the OpenSSH binaries in /usr/local/bin, configuration files
in /usr/local/etc, the server in /usr/local/sbin, etc. To specify a different
installation prefix, use the --prefix option to configure:
./configure --prefix=/opt
make
make install
Will install OpenSSH in /opt/{bin,etc,lib,sbin}. You can also override
specific paths, for example:
./configure --prefix=/opt --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh
make
make install
This will install the binaries in /opt/{bin,lib,sbin}, but will place the
configuration files in /etc/ssh.
If you are using Privilege Separation (which is enabled by default)
then you will also need to create the user, group and directory used by
sshd for privilege separation. See README.privsep for details.
If you are using PAM, you may need to manually install a PAM control
file as "/etc/pam.d/sshd" (or wherever your system prefers to keep
them). Note that the service name used to start PAM is __progname,
which is the basename of the path of your sshd (e.g., the service name
for /usr/sbin/osshd will be osshd). If you have renamed your sshd
executable, your PAM configuration may need to be modified.
A generic PAM configuration is included as "contrib/sshd.pam.generic",
you may need to edit it before using it on your system. If you are
using a recent version of Red Hat Linux, the config file in
contrib/redhat/sshd.pam should be more useful. Failure to install a
valid PAM file may result in an inability to use password
authentication. On HP-UX 11 and Solaris, the standard /etc/pam.conf
configuration will work with sshd (sshd will match the other service
name).
There are a few other options to the configure script:
--with-audit=[module] enable additional auditing via the specified module.
Currently, drivers for "debug" (additional info via syslog) and "bsm"
(Sun's Basic Security Module) are supported.
--with-pam enables PAM support. If PAM support is compiled in, it must
also be enabled in sshd_config (refer to the UsePAM directive).
--with-prngd-socket=/some/file allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD
support and to specify a PRNGd socket. Use this if your Unix lacks
/dev/random and you don't want to use OpenSSH's builtin entropy
collection support.
--with-prngd-port=portnum allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD support
and to specify a EGD localhost TCP port. Use this if your Unix lacks
/dev/random and you don't want to use OpenSSH's builtin entropy
collection support.
--with-lastlog=FILE will specify the location of the lastlog file.
./configure searches a few locations for lastlog, but may not find
it if lastlog is installed in a different place.
--without-lastlog will disable lastlog support entirely.
--with-osfsia, --without-osfsia will enable or disable OSF1's Security
Integration Architecture. The default for OSF1 machines is enable.
--with-skey=PATH will enable S/Key one time password support. You will
need the S/Key libraries and header files installed for this to work.
--with-md5-passwords will enable the use of MD5 passwords. Enable this
if your operating system uses MD5 passwords and the system crypt() does
not support them directly (see the crypt(3/3c) man page). If enabled, the
resulting binary will support both MD5 and traditional crypt passwords.
--with-utmpx enables utmpx support. utmpx support is automatic for
some platforms.
--without-shadow disables shadow password support.
--with-ipaddr-display forces the use of a numeric IP address in the
$DISPLAY environment variable. Some broken systems need this.
--with-default-path=PATH allows you to specify a default $PATH for sessions
started by sshd. This replaces the standard path entirely.
--with-pid-dir=PATH specifies the directory in which the sshd.pid file is
created.
--with-xauth=PATH specifies the location of the xauth binary
--with-ssl-dir=DIR allows you to specify where your Libre/OpenSSL
libraries
are installed.
--with-ssl-engine enables Libre/OpenSSL's (hardware) ENGINE support
--with-4in6 Check for IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and convert them to
real (AF_INET) IPv4 addresses. Works around some quirks on Linux.
If you need to pass special options to the compiler or linker, you
can specify these as environment variables before running ./configure.
For example:
CFLAGS="-O -m486" LDFLAGS="-s" LIBS="-lrubbish" LD="/usr/foo/ld" ./configure
3. Configuration
----------------
The runtime configuration files are installed by in ${prefix}/etc or
whatever you specified as your --sysconfdir (/usr/local/etc by default).
The default configuration should be instantly usable, though you should
review it to ensure that it matches your security requirements.
To generate a host key, run "make host-key". Alternately you can do so
manually using the following commands:
ssh-keygen -t [type] -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N ""
for each of the types you wish to generate (rsa, dsa or ecdsa) or
ssh-keygen -A
to generate keys for all supported types.
Replacing /etc/ssh with the correct path to the configuration directory.
(${prefix}/etc or whatever you specified with --sysconfdir during
configuration)
If you have configured OpenSSH with EGD support, ensure that EGD is
running and has collected some Entropy.
For more information on configuration, please refer to the manual pages
for sshd, ssh and ssh-agent.
4. (Optional) Send survey
-------------------------
$ make survey
[check the contents of the file "survey" to ensure there's no information
that you consider sensitive]
$ make send-survey
This will send configuration information for the currently configured
host to a survey address. This will help determine which configurations
are actually in use, and what valid combinations of configure options
exist. The raw data is available only to the OpenSSH developers, however
summary data may be published.
5. Problems?
------------
If you experience problems compiling, installing or running OpenSSH.
Please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at
https://www.openssh.com/
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[Note: This file has not been updated for OpenSSH versions after
OpenSSH-1.2 and should be considered OBSOLETE. It has been left in
the distribution because some of its information may still be useful
to developers.]
This document is intended for those who wish to read the ssh source
code. This tries to give an overview of the structure of the code.
Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
Updated 17 Nov 1995.
Updated 19 Oct 1999 for OpenSSH-1.2
Updated 20 May 2001 note obsolete for > OpenSSH-1.2
The software consists of ssh (client), sshd (server), scp, sdist, and
the auxiliary programs ssh-keygen, ssh-agent, ssh-add, and
make-ssh-known-hosts. The main program for each of these is in a .c
file with the same name.
There are some subsystems/abstractions that are used by a number of
these programs.
Buffer manipulation routines
- These provide an arbitrary size buffer, where data can be appended.
Data can be consumed from either end. The code is used heavily
throughout ssh. The basic buffer manipulation functions are in
buffer.c (header buffer.h), and additional code to manipulate specific
data types is in bufaux.c.
Compression Library
- Ssh uses the GNU GZIP compression library (ZLIB).
Encryption/Decryption
- Ssh contains several encryption algorithms. These are all
accessed through the cipher.h interface. The interface code is
in cipher.c, and the implementations are in libc.
Multiple Precision Integer Library
- Uses the SSLeay BIGNUM sublibrary.
Random Numbers
- Uses arc4random() and such.
RSA key generation, encryption, decryption
- Ssh uses the RSA routines in libssl.
RSA key files
- RSA keys are stored in files with a special format. The code to
read/write these files is in authfile.c. The files are normally
encrypted with a passphrase. The functions to read passphrases
are in readpass.c (the same code is used to read passwords).
Binary packet protocol
- The ssh binary packet protocol is implemented in packet.c. The
code in packet.c does not concern itself with packet types or their
execution; it contains code to build packets, to receive them and
extract data from them, and the code to compress and/or encrypt
packets. CRC code comes from crc32.c.
- The code in packet.c calls the buffer manipulation routines
(buffer.c, bufaux.c), compression routines (zlib), and the
encryption routines.
X11, TCP/IP, and Agent forwarding
- Code for various types of channel forwarding is in channels.c.
The file defines a generic framework for arbitrary communication
channels inside the secure channel, and uses this framework to
implement X11 forwarding, TCP/IP forwarding, and authentication
agent forwarding.
The new, Protocol 1.5, channel close implementation is in nchan.c
Authentication agent
- Code to communicate with the authentication agent is in authfd.c.
Authentication methods
- Code for various authentication methods resides in auth-*.c
(auth-passwd.c, auth-rh-rsa.c, auth-rhosts.c, auth-rsa.c). This
code is linked into the server. The routines also manipulate
known hosts files using code in hostfile.c. Code in canohost.c
is used to retrieve the canonical host name of the remote host.
Code in match.c is used to match host names.
- In the client end, authentication code is in sshconnect.c. It
reads Passwords/passphrases using code in readpass.c. It reads
RSA key files with authfile.c. It communicates the
authentication agent using authfd.c.
The ssh client
- The client main program is in ssh.c. It first parses arguments
and reads configuration (readconf.c), then calls ssh_connect (in
sshconnect.c) to open a connection to the server (possibly via a
proxy), and performs authentication (ssh_login in sshconnect.c).
It then makes any pty, forwarding, etc. requests. It may call
code in ttymodes.c to encode current tty modes. Finally it
calls client_loop in clientloop.c. This does the real work for
the session.
- The client is suid root. It tries to temporarily give up this
rights while reading the configuration data. The root
privileges are only used to make the connection (from a
privileged socket). Any extra privileges are dropped before
calling ssh_login.
Pseudo-tty manipulation and tty modes
- Code to allocate and use a pseudo tty is in pty.c. Code to
encode and set terminal modes is in ttymodes.c.
Logging in (updating utmp, lastlog, etc.)
- The code to do things that are done when a user logs in are in
login.c. This includes things such as updating the utmp, wtmp,
and lastlog files. Some of the code is in sshd.c.
Writing to the system log and terminal
- The programs use the functions fatal(), log(), debug(), error()
in many places to write messages to system log or user's
terminal. The implementation that logs to system log is in
log-server.c; it is used in the server program. The other
programs use an implementation that sends output to stderr; it
is in log-client.c. The definitions are in ssh.h.
The sshd server (daemon)
- The sshd daemon starts by processing arguments and reading the
configuration file (servconf.c). It then reads the host key,
starts listening for connections, and generates the server key.
The server key will be regenerated every hour by an alarm.
- When the server receives a connection, it forks, disables the
regeneration alarm, and starts communicating with the client.
They first perform identification string exchange, then
negotiate encryption, then perform authentication, preparatory
operations, and finally the server enters the normal session
mode by calling server_loop in serverloop.c. This does the real
work, calling functions in other modules.
- The code for the server is in sshd.c. It contains a lot of
stuff, including:
- server main program
- waiting for connections
- processing new connection
- authentication
- preparatory operations
- building up the execution environment for the user program
- starting the user program.
Auxiliary files
- There are several other files in the distribution that contain
various auxiliary routines:
ssh.h the main header file for ssh (various definitions)
uidswap.c uid-swapping
xmalloc.c "safe" malloc routines
$OpenBSD: OVERVIEW,v 1.12 2015/07/08 19:01:15 markus Exp $
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This document describes the chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com authenticated
encryption cipher supported by OpenSSH.
Background
----------
ChaCha20 is a stream cipher designed by Daniel Bernstein and described
in [1]. It operates by permuting 128 fixed bits, 128 or 256 bits of key,
a 64 bit nonce and a 64 bit counter into 64 bytes of output. This output
is used as a keystream, with any unused bytes simply discarded.
Poly1305[2], also by Daniel Bernstein, is a one-time Carter-Wegman MAC
that computes a 128 bit integrity tag given a message and a single-use
256 bit secret key.
The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com combines these two primitives into an
authenticated encryption mode. The construction used is based on that
proposed for TLS by Adam Langley in [3], but differs in the layout of
data passed to the MAC and in the addition of encyption of the packet
lengths.
Negotiation
-----------
The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com offers both encryption and
authentication. As such, no separate MAC is required. If the
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com cipher is selected in key exchange,
the offered MAC algorithms are ignored and no MAC is required to be
negotiated.
Detailed Construction
---------------------
The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com cipher requires 512 bits of key
material as output from the SSH key exchange. This forms two 256 bit
keys (K_1 and K_2), used by two separate instances of chacha20.
The first 256 bits consitute K_2 and the second 256 bits become
K_1.
The instance keyed by K_1 is a stream cipher that is used only
to encrypt the 4 byte packet length field. The second instance,
keyed by K_2, is used in conjunction with poly1305 to build an AEAD
(Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) that is used to encrypt
and authenticate the entire packet.
Two separate cipher instances are used here so as to keep the packet
lengths confidential but not create an oracle for the packet payload
cipher by decrypting and using the packet length prior to checking
the MAC. By using an independently-keyed cipher instance to encrypt the
length, an active attacker seeking to exploit the packet input handling
as a decryption oracle can learn nothing about the payload contents or
its MAC (assuming key derivation, ChaCha20 and Poly1305 are secure).
The AEAD is constructed as follows: for each packet, generate a Poly1305
key by taking the first 256 bits of ChaCha20 stream output generated
using K_2, an IV consisting of the packet sequence number encoded as an
uint64 under the SSH wire encoding rules and a ChaCha20 block counter of
zero. The K_2 ChaCha20 block counter is then set to the little-endian
encoding of 1 (i.e. {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}) and this instance is used
for encryption of the packet payload.
Packet Handling
---------------
When receiving a packet, the length must be decrypted first. When 4
bytes of ciphertext length have been received, they may be decrypted
using the K_1 key, a nonce consisting of the packet sequence number
encoded as a uint64 under the usual SSH wire encoding and a zero block
counter to obtain the plaintext length.
Once the entire packet has been received, the MAC MUST be checked
before decryption. A per-packet Poly1305 key is generated as described
above and the MAC tag calculated using Poly1305 with this key over the
ciphertext of the packet length and the payload together. The calculated
MAC is then compared in constant time with the one appended to the
packet and the packet decrypted using ChaCha20 as described above (with
K_2, the packet sequence number as nonce and a starting block counter of
1).
To send a packet, first encode the 4 byte length and encrypt it using
K_1. Encrypt the packet payload (using K_2) and append it to the
encrypted length. Finally, calculate a MAC tag and append it.
Rekeying
--------
ChaCha20 must never reuse a {key, nonce} for encryption nor may it be
used to encrypt more than 2^70 bytes under the same {key, nonce}. The
SSH Transport protocol (RFC4253) recommends a far more conservative
rekeying every 1GB of data sent or received. If this recommendation
is followed, then chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com requires no special
handling in this area.
References
----------
[1] "ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20", Daniel Bernstein
http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf
[2] "The Poly1305-AES message-authentication code", Daniel Bernstein
http://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf
[3] "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 based Cipher Suites for TLS", Adam Langley
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305,v 1.3 2016/05/03 13:10:24 djm Exp $
PROTOCOL.key 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
This document describes the private key format for OpenSSH.
1. Overall format
The key consists of a header, a list of public keys, and
an encrypted list of matching private keys.
#define AUTH_MAGIC "openssh-key-v1"
byte[] AUTH_MAGIC
string ciphername
string kdfname
string kdfoptions
int number of keys N
string publickey1
string publickey2
...
string publickeyN
string encrypted, padded list of private keys
2. KDF options for kdfname "bcrypt"
The options:
string salt
uint32 rounds
are concatenated and represented as a string.
3. Unencrypted list of N private keys
The list of privatekey/comment pairs is padded with the
bytes 1, 2, 3, ... until the total length is a multiple
of the cipher block size.
uint32 checkint
uint32 checkint
string privatekey1
string comment1
string privatekey2
string comment2
...
string privatekeyN
string commentN
char 1
char 2
char 3
...
char padlen % 255
Before the key is encrypted, a random integer is assigned
to both checkint fields so successful decryption can be
quickly checked by verifying that both checkint fields
hold the same value.
4. Encryption
The KDF is used to derive a key, IV (and other values required by
the cipher) from the passphrase. These values are then used to
encrypt the unencrypted list of private keys.
5. No encryption
For unencrypted keys the cipher "none" and the KDF "none"
are used with empty passphrases. The options if the KDF "none"
are the empty string.
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.key,v 1.1 2013/12/06 13:34:54 markus Exp $
PROTOCOL.krl 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
This describes the key/certificate revocation list format for OpenSSH.
1. Overall format
The KRL consists of a header and zero or more sections. The header is:
#define KRL_MAGIC 0x5353484b524c0a00ULL /* "SSHKRL\n\0" */
#define KRL_FORMAT_VERSION 1
uint64 KRL_MAGIC
uint32 KRL_FORMAT_VERSION
uint64 krl_version
uint64 generated_date
uint64 flags
string reserved
string comment
Where "krl_version" is a version number that increases each time the KRL
is modified, "generated_date" is the time in seconds since 1970-01-01
00:00:00 UTC that the KRL was generated, "comment" is an optional comment
and "reserved" an extension field whose contents are currently ignored.
No "flags" are currently defined.
Following the header are zero or more sections, each consisting of:
byte section_type
string section_data
Where "section_type" indicates the type of the "section_data". An exception
to this is the KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section, that has a slightly different
format (see below).
The available section types are:
#define KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES 1
#define KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY 2
#define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 3
#define KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE 4
2. Certificate section
These sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES to revoke certificates by
serial number or key ID. The consist of the CA key that issued the
certificates to be revoked and a reserved field whose contents is currently
ignored.
string ca_key
string reserved
Where "ca_key" is the standard SSH wire serialisation of the CA's
public key. Alternately, "ca_key" may be an empty string to indicate
the certificate section applies to all CAs (this is most useful when
revoking key IDs).
Followed by one or more sections:
byte cert_section_type
string cert_section_data
The certificate section types are:
#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST 0x20
#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE 0x21
#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP 0x22
#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID 0x23
2.1 Certificate serial list section
This section is identified as KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST. It revokes
certificates by listing their serial numbers. The cert_section_data in this
case contains:
uint64 revoked_cert_serial
uint64 ...
This section may appear multiple times.
2.2. Certificate serial range section
These sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE and hold
a range of serial numbers of certificates:
uint64 serial_min
uint64 serial_max
All certificates in the range serial_min <= serial <= serial_max are
revoked.
This section may appear multiple times.
2.3. Certificate serial bitmap section
Bitmap sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP and revoke keys
by listing their serial number in a bitmap.
uint64 serial_offset
mpint revoked_keys_bitmap
A bit set at index N in the bitmap corresponds to revocation of a keys with
serial number (serial_offset + N).
This section may appear multiple times.
2.4. Revoked key ID sections
KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID sections revoke particular certificate "key
ID" strings. This may be useful in revoking all certificates
associated with a particular identity, e.g. a host or a user.
string key_id[0]
...
This section must contain at least one "key_id". This section may appear
multiple times.
3. Explicit key sections
These sections, identified as KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY, revoke keys
(not certificates). They are less space efficient than serial numbers,
but are able to revoke plain keys.
string public_key_blob[0]
....
This section must contain at least one "public_key_blob". The blob
must be a raw key (i.e. not a certificate).
This section may appear multiple times.
4. SHA1 fingerprint sections
These sections, identified as KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1, revoke
plain keys (i.e. not certificates) by listing their SHA1 hashes:
string public_key_hash[0]
....
This section must contain at least one "public_key_hash". The hash blob
is obtained by taking the SHA1 hash of the public key blob. Hashes in
this section must appear in numeric order, treating each hash as a big-
endian integer.
This section may appear multiple times.
5. KRL signature sections
The KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section serves a different purpose to the
preceeding ones: to provide cryptographic authentication of a KRL that
is retrieved over a channel that does not provide integrity protection.
Its format is slightly different to the previously-described sections:
in order to simplify the signature generation, it includes as a "body"
two string components instead of one.
byte KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE
string signature_key
string signature
The signature is calculated over the entire KRL from the KRL_MAGIC
to this subsection's "signature_key", including both and using the
signature generation rules appropriate for the type of "signature_key".
This section must appear last in the KRL. If multiple signature sections
appear, they must appear consecutively at the end of the KRL file.
Implementations that retrieve KRLs over untrusted channels must verify
signatures. Signature sections are optional for KRLs distributed by
trusted means.
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.krl,v 1.3 2015/01/30 01:10:33 djm Exp $
PROTOCOL.mux 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
This document describes the multiplexing protocol used by ssh(1)'s
ControlMaster connection-sharing.
Most messages from the client to the server contain a "request id" field.
This field is returned in replies as "client request id" to facilitate
matching of responses to requests.
1. Connection setup
When a multiplexing connection is made to a ssh(1) operating as a
ControlMaster from a ssh(1) in multiplex slave mode, the first
action of each is to exchange hello messages:
uint32 MUX_MSG_HELLO
uint32 protocol version
string extension name [optional]
string extension value [optional]
...
The current version of the mux protocol is 4. A slave should refuse
to connect to a master that speaks an unsupported protocol version.
Following the version identifier are zero or more extensions
represented as a name/value pair. No extensions are currently
defined.
2. Opening sessions
To open a new multiplexed session, a client may send the following
request:
uint32 MUX_C_NEW_SESSION
uint32 request id
string reserved
bool want tty flag
bool want X11 forwarding flag
bool want agent flag
bool subsystem flag
uint32 escape char
string terminal type
string command
string environment string 0 [optional]
...
To disable the use of an escape character, "escape char" may be set
to 0xffffffff. "terminal type" is generally set to the value of
$TERM. zero or more environment strings may follow the command.
The client then sends its standard input, output and error file
descriptors (in that order) using Unix domain socket control messages.
The contents of "reserved" are currently ignored.
If successful, the server will reply with MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED
uint32 MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED
uint32 client request id
uint32 session id
Otherwise it will reply with an error: MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or
MUX_S_FAILURE.
Once the server has received the fds, it will respond with MUX_S_OK
indicating that the session is up. The client now waits for the
session to end. When it does, the server will send an exit status
message:
uint32 MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE
uint32 session id
uint32 exit value
The client should exit with this value to mimic the behaviour of a
non-multiplexed ssh(1) connection. Two additional cases that the
client must cope with are it receiving a signal itself and the
server disconnecting without sending an exit message.
A master may also send a MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL before MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE
if remote TTY allocation was unsuccessful. The client may use this to
return its local tty to "cooked" mode.
uint32 MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL
uint32 session id
3. Health checks
The client may request a health check/PID report from a server:
uint32 MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK
uint32 request id
The server replies with:
uint32 MUX_S_ALIVE
uint32 client request id
uint32 server pid
4. Remotely terminating a master
A client may request that a master terminate immediately:
uint32 MUX_C_TERMINATE
uint32 request id
The server will reply with one of MUX_S_OK or MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED.
5. Requesting establishment of port forwards
A client may request the master to establish a port forward:
uint32 MUX_C_OPEN_FWD
uint32 request id
uint32 forwarding type
string listen host
uint32 listen port
string connect host
uint32 connect port
forwarding type may be MUX_FWD_LOCAL, MUX_FWD_REMOTE, MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC.
If listen port is (unsigned int) -2, then the listen host is treated as
a unix socket path name.
If connect port is (unsigned int) -2, then the connect host is treated
as a unix socket path name.
A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT, a
MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a MUX_S_FAILURE.
For dynamically allocated listen port the server replies with
uint32 MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT
uint32 client request id
uint32 allocated remote listen port
6. Requesting closure of port forwards
Note: currently unimplemented (server will always reply with MUX_S_FAILURE).
A client may request the master to close a port forward:
uint32 MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD
uint32 request id
uint32 forwarding type
string listen host
uint32 listen port
string connect host
uint32 connect port
A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a
MUX_S_FAILURE.
7. Requesting stdio forwarding
A client may request the master to establish a stdio forwarding:
uint32 MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD
uint32 request id
string reserved
string connect host
string connect port
The client then sends its standard input and output file descriptors
(in that order) using Unix domain socket control messages.
The contents of "reserved" are currently ignored.
A server may reply with a MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED
or a MUX_S_FAILURE.
8. Requesting shutdown of mux listener
A client may request the master to stop accepting new multiplexing requests
and remove its listener socket.
uint32 MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING
uint32 request id
A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a
MUX_S_FAILURE.
9. Status messages
The MUX_S_OK message is empty:
uint32 MUX_S_OK
uint32 client request id
The MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED and MUX_S_FAILURE include a reason:
uint32 MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED
uint32 client request id
string reason
uint32 MUX_S_FAILURE
uint32 client request id
string reason
10. Protocol numbers
#define MUX_MSG_HELLO 0x00000001
#define MUX_C_NEW_SESSION 0x10000002
#define MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK 0x10000004
#define MUX_C_TERMINATE 0x10000005
#define MUX_C_OPEN_FWD 0x10000006
#define MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD 0x10000007
#define MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD 0x10000008
#define MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING 0x10000009
#define MUX_S_OK 0x80000001
#define MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED 0x80000002
#define MUX_S_FAILURE 0x80000003
#define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE 0x80000004
#define MUX_S_ALIVE 0x80000005
#define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED 0x80000006
#define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT 0x80000007
#define MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL 0x80000008
#define MUX_FWD_LOCAL 1
#define MUX_FWD_REMOTE 2
#define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3
XXX TODO
XXX extended status (e.g. report open channels / forwards)
XXX lock (maybe)
XXX watch in/out traffic (pre/post crypto)
XXX inject packet (what about replies)
XXX server->client error/warning notifications
XXX send signals via mux
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.mux,v 1.10 2015/07/17 03:04:27 djm Exp $
README 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#7.5p1 for the release notes.
Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html for bug reporting
instructions and note that we do not use Github for bug reporting or
patch/pull-request management.
- A Japanese translation of this document and of the release notes is
- available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html
- Thanks to HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@unixuser.org>
This is the port of OpenBSD's excellent OpenSSH[0] to Linux and other
Unices.
OpenSSH is based on the last free version of Tatu Ylonen's sample
implementation with all patent-encumbered algorithms removed (to
external libraries), all known security bugs fixed, new features
reintroduced and many other clean-ups. OpenSSH has been created by
Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt,
and Dug Song. It has a homepage at https://www.openssh.com/
This port consists of the re-introduction of autoconf support, PAM
support, EGD[1]/PRNGD[2] support and replacements for OpenBSD library
functions that are (regrettably) absent from other unices. This port
has been best tested on AIX, Cygwin, HP-UX, Linux, MacOS/X,
NetBSD, OpenBSD, OpenServer, Solaris, Unicos, and UnixWare.
This version actively tracks changes in the OpenBSD CVS repository.
The PAM support is now more functional than the popular packages of
commercial ssh-1.2.x. It checks "account" and "session" modules for
all logins, not just when using password authentication.
OpenSSH depends on Zlib[3], OpenSSL[4] and optionally PAM[5].
There is now several mailing lists for this port of OpenSSH. Please
refer to https://www.openssh.com/list.html for details on how to join.
Please send bug reports and patches to the mailing list
openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org. The list is open to posting by unsubscribed
users. Code contribution are welcomed, but please follow the OpenBSD
style guidelines[6].
Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on how to install
OpenSSH on your system.
Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Miscellania -
This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD
CVS repository which in turn was based on the last free sample
implementation released by Tatu Ylonen.
References -
[0] https://www.openssh.com/
[1] http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/
[2] http://www.aet.tu-cottbus.de/personen/jaenicke/postfix_tls/prngd.html
[3] http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
[4] http://www.openssl.org/
[5] http://www.openpam.org
http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/
(PAM also is standard on Solaris and HP-UX 11)
[6] http://man.openbsd.org/style.9
README.dns 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
How to verify host keys using OpenSSH and DNS
---------------------------------------------
OpenSSH contains support for verifying host keys using DNS as described in
draft-ietf-secsh-dns-05.txt. The document contains very brief instructions
on how to use this feature. Configuring DNS is out of the scope of this
document.
(1) Server: Generate and publish the DNS RR
To create a DNS resource record (RR) containing a fingerprint of the
public host key, use the following command:
ssh-keygen -r hostname -f keyfile -g
where "hostname" is your fully qualified hostname and "keyfile" is the
file containing the public host key file. If you have multiple keys,
you should generate one RR for each key.
In the example above, ssh-keygen will print the fingerprint in a
generic DNS RR format parsable by most modern name server
implementations. If your nameserver has support for the SSHFP RR
you can omit the -g flag and ssh-keygen will print a standard SSHFP RR.
To publish the fingerprint using the DNS you must add the generated RR
to your DNS zone file and sign your zone.
(2) Client: Enable ssh to verify host keys using DNS
To enable the ssh client to verify host keys using DNS, you have to
add the following option to the ssh configuration file
($HOME/.ssh/config or /etc/ssh/ssh_config):
VerifyHostKeyDNS yes
Upon connection the client will try to look up the fingerprint RR
using DNS. If the fingerprint received from the DNS server matches
the remote host key, the user will be notified.
Jakob Schlyter
Wesley Griffin
$OpenBSD: README.dns,v 1.2 2003/10/14 19:43:23 jakob Exp $
README.platform 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
This file contains notes about OpenSSH on specific platforms.
AIX
---
As of OpenSSH 3.8p1, sshd will now honour an accounts password expiry
settings, where previously it did not. Because of this, it's possible for
sites that have used OpenSSH's sshd exclusively to have accounts which
have passwords expired longer than the inactive time (ie the "Weeks between
password EXPIRATION and LOCKOUT" setting in SMIT or the maxexpired
chuser attribute).
Accounts in this state must have their passwords reset manually by the
administrator. As a precaution, it is recommended that the administrative
passwords be reset before upgrading from OpenSSH <3.8.
As of OpenSSH 4.0, configure will attempt to detect if your version
and maintenance level of AIX has a working getaddrinfo, and will use it
if found. This will enable IPv6 support. If for some reason configure
gets it wrong, or if you want to build binaries to work on earlier MLs
than the build host then you can add "-DBROKEN_GETADDRINFO" to CFLAGS
to force the previous IPv4-only behaviour.
IPv6 known to work: 5.1ML7 5.2ML2 5.2ML5
IPv6 known broken: 4.3.3ML11 5.1ML4
If you wish to use dynamic libraries that aren't in the normal system
locations (eg IBM's OpenSSL and zlib packages) then you will need to
define the environment variable blibpath before running configure, eg
blibpath=/lib:/usr/lib:/opt/freeware/lib ./configure \
--with-ssl-dir=/opt/freeware --with-zlib=/opt/freeware
If sshd is built with the WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE option (which is enabled
by default) then sshd checks that users are permitted via the
loginrestrictions() function, in particular that the user has the
"rlogin" attribute set. This check is not done for the root account,
instead the PermitRootLogin setting in sshd_config is used.
If you are using the IBM compiler you probably want to use CC=xlc rather
than the default of cc.
Cygwin
------
To build on Cygwin, OpenSSH requires the following packages:
gcc, gcc-mingw-core, mingw-runtime, binutils, make, openssl,
openssl-devel, zlib, minres, minires-devel.
Darwin and MacOS X
------------------
Darwin does not provide a tun(4) driver required for OpenSSH-based
virtual private networks. The BSD manpage still exists, but the driver
has been removed in recent releases of Darwin and MacOS X.
Nevertheless, tunnel support is known to work with Darwin 8 and
MacOS X 10.4 in Point-to-Point (Layer 3) and Ethernet (Layer 2) mode
using a third party driver. More information is available at:
http://www-user.rhrk.uni-kl.de/~nissler/tuntap/
Linux
-----
Some Linux distributions (including Red Hat/Fedora/CentOS) include
headers and library links in the -devel RPMs rather than the main
binary RPMs. If you get an error about headers, or complaining about a
missing prerequisite then you may need to install the equivalent
development packages. On Redhat based distros these may be openssl-devel,
zlib-devel and pam-devel, on Debian based distros these may be
libssl-dev, libz-dev and libpam-dev.
Solaris
-------
If you enable BSM auditing on Solaris, you need to update audit_event(4)
for praudit(1m) to give sensible output. The following line needs to be
added to /etc/security/audit_event:
32800:AUE_openssh:OpenSSH login:lo
The BSM audit event range available for third party TCB applications is
32768 - 65535. Event number 32800 has been choosen for AUE_openssh.
There is no official registry of 3rd party event numbers, so if this
number is already in use on your system, you may change it at build time
by configure'ing --with-cflags=-DAUE_openssh=32801 then rebuilding.
Platforms using PAM
-------------------
As of OpenSSH 4.3p1, sshd will no longer check /etc/nologin itself when
PAM is enabled. To maintain existing behaviour, pam_nologin should be
added to sshd's session stack which will prevent users from starting shell
sessions. Alternatively, pam_nologin can be added to either the auth or
account stacks which will prevent authentication entirely, but will still
return the output from pam_nologin to the client.
README.privsep 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
Privilege separation, or privsep, is method in OpenSSH by which
operations that require root privilege are performed by a separate
privileged monitor process. Its purpose is to prevent privilege
escalation by containing corruption to an unprivileged process.
More information is available at:
http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/ssh/privsep.html
Privilege separation is now enabled by default; see the
UsePrivilegeSeparation option in sshd_config(5).
When privsep is enabled, during the pre-authentication phase sshd will
chroot(2) to "/var/empty" and change its privileges to the "sshd" user
and its primary group. sshd is a pseudo-account that should not be
used by other daemons, and must be locked and should contain a
"nologin" or invalid shell.
You should do something like the following to prepare the privsep
preauth environment:
# mkdir /var/empty
# chown root:sys /var/empty
# chmod 755 /var/empty
# groupadd sshd
# useradd -g sshd -c 'sshd privsep' -d /var/empty -s /bin/false sshd
/var/empty should not contain any files.
configure supports the following options to change the default
privsep user and chroot directory:
--with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot
--with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation
PAM-enabled OpenSSH is known to function with privsep on AIX, FreeBSD,
HP-UX (including Trusted Mode), Linux, NetBSD and Solaris.
On Cygwin, Tru64 Unix, OpenServer, and Unicos only the pre-authentication
part of privsep is supported. Post-authentication privsep is disabled
automatically (so you won't see the additional process mentioned below).
Note that for a normal interactive login with a shell, enabling privsep
will require 1 additional process per login session.
Given the following process listing (from HP-UX):
UID PID PPID C STIME TTY TIME COMMAND
root 1005 1 0 10:45:17 ? 0:08 /opt/openssh/sbin/sshd -u0
root 6917 1005 0 15:19:16 ? 0:00 sshd: stevesk [priv]
stevesk 6919 6917 0 15:19:17 ? 0:03 sshd: stevesk@2
stevesk 6921 6919 0 15:19:17 pts/2 0:00 -bash
process 1005 is the sshd process listening for new connections.
process 6917 is the privileged monitor process, 6919 is the user owned
sshd process and 6921 is the shell process.
README.tun 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
How to use OpenSSH-based virtual private networks
-------------------------------------------------
OpenSSH contains support for VPN tunneling using the tun(4) network
tunnel pseudo-device which is available on most platforms, either for
layer 2 or 3 traffic.
The following brief instructions on how to use this feature use
a network configuration specific to the OpenBSD operating system.
(1) Server: Enable support for SSH tunneling
To enable the ssh server to accept tunnel requests from the client, you
have to add the following option to the ssh server configuration file
(/etc/ssh/sshd_config):
PermitTunnel yes
Restart the server or send the hangup signal (SIGHUP) to let the server
reread it's configuration.
(2) Server: Restrict client access and assign the tunnel
The OpenSSH server simply uses the file /root/.ssh/authorized_keys to
restrict the client to connect to a specified tunnel and to
automatically start the related interface configuration command. These
settings are optional but recommended:
tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... reyk@openbsd.org
(3) Client: Configure the local network tunnel interface
Use the hostname.if(5) interface-specific configuration file to set up
the network tunnel configuration with OpenBSD. For example, use the
following configuration in /etc/hostname.tun0 to set up the layer 3
tunnel on the client:
inet 192.168.5.1 255.255.255.252 192.168.5.2
OpenBSD also supports layer 2 tunneling over the tun device by adding
the link0 flag:
inet 192.168.1.78 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.255 link0
Layer 2 tunnels can be used in combination with an Ethernet bridge(4)
interface, like the following example for /etc/bridgename.bridge0:
add tun0
add sis0
up
(4) Client: Configure the OpenSSH client
To establish tunnel forwarding for connections to a specified
remote host by default, use the following ssh client configuration for
the privileged user (in /root/.ssh/config):
Host sshgateway
Tunnel yes
TunnelDevice 0:any
PermitLocalCommand yes
LocalCommand sh /etc/netstart tun0
A more complicated configuration is possible to establish a tunnel to
a remote host which is not directly accessible by the client.
The following example describes a client configuration to connect to
the remote host over two ssh hops in between. It uses the OpenSSH
ProxyCommand in combination with the nc(1) program to forward the final
ssh tunnel destination over multiple ssh sessions.
Host access.somewhere.net
User puffy
Host dmzgw
User puffy
ProxyCommand ssh access.somewhere.net nc dmzgw 22
Host sshgateway
Tunnel Ethernet
TunnelDevice 0:any
PermitLocalCommand yes
LocalCommand sh /etc/netstart tun0
ProxyCommand ssh dmzgw nc sshgateway 22
The following network plan illustrates the previous configuration in
combination with layer 2 tunneling and Ethernet bridging.
+--------+ ( ) +----------------------+
| Client |------( Internet )-----| access.somewhere.net |
+--------+ ( ) +----------------------+
: 192.168.1.78 |
:............................. +-------+
Forwarded ssh connection : | dmzgw |
Layer 2 tunnel : +-------+
: |
: |
: +------------+
:......| sshgateway |
| +------------+
--- real connection Bridge -> | +----------+
... "virtual connection" [ X ]--------| somehost |
[X] switch +----------+
192.168.1.25
(5) Client: Connect to the server and establish the tunnel
Finally connect to the OpenSSH server to establish the tunnel by using
the following command:
ssh sshgateway
It is also possible to tell the client to fork into the background after
the connection has been successfully established:
ssh -f sshgateway true
Without the ssh configuration done in step (4), it is also possible
to use the following command lines:
ssh -fw 0:1 sshgateway true
ifconfig tun0 192.168.5.1 192.168.5.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
Using OpenSSH tunnel forwarding is a simple way to establish secure
and ad hoc virtual private networks. Possible fields of application
could be wireless networks or administrative VPN tunnels.
Nevertheless, ssh tunneling requires some packet header overhead and
runs on top of TCP. It is still suggested to use the IP Security
Protocol (IPSec) for robust and permanent VPN connections and to
interconnect corporate networks.
Reyk Floeter
$OpenBSD: README.tun,v 1.4 2006/03/28 00:12:31 deraadt Exp $
TODO 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
Documentation:
- Update the docs
- Update README
- Update INSTALL
- Merge INSTALL & README.privsep
- Install FAQ?
- General FAQ on S/Key, TIS, RSA, RSA2, DSA, etc and suggestions on when it
would be best to use them.
- Create a Documentation/ directory?
Programming:
- Grep for 'XXX' comments and fix
- Link order is incorrect for some systems using Kerberos 4 and AFS. Result
is multiple inclusion of DES symbols. Holger Trapp
<holger.trapp@hrz.tu-chemnitz.de> reports that changing the configure
generated link order from:
-lresolv -lkrb -lz -lnsl -lutil -lkafs -lkrb -ldes -lcrypto
to:
-lresolv -lkrb -lz -lnsl -lutil -lcrypto -lkafs -lkrb -ldes
fixing the problem.
- Write a test program that calls stat() to search for EGD/PRNGd socket
rather than use the (non-portable) "test -S".
- More platforms for for setproctitle() emulation (testing needed)
- Improve PAM ChallengeResponseAuthentication
- Informational messages
- Use different PAM service name for kbdint vs regular auth (suggest from
Solar Designer)
- Ability to select which ChallengeResponseAuthentications may be used
and order to try them in e.g. "ChallengeResponseAuthentication skey, pam"
- Complete Tru64 SIA support
- It looks like we could merge it into the password auth code to cut down
on diff size. Maybe PAM password auth too?
- Finish integrating kernel-level auditing code for IRIX and SOLARIS
(Gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com)
- 64-bit builds on HP-UX 11.X (stevesk@pobox.com):
- utmp/wtmp get corrupted (something in loginrec?)
- can't build with PAM (no 64-bit libpam yet)
Clean up configure/makefiles:
- Clean up configure.ac - There are a few double #defined variables
left to do. HAVE_LOGIN is one of them. Consider NOT looking for
information in wtmpx or utmpx or any of that stuff if it's not detected
from the start
- Replace the whole u_intXX_t evilness in acconfig.h with something better???
- Do it in configure.ac
- Consider splitting the u_intXX_t test for sys/bitype.h into seperate test
to allow people to (right/wrongfully) link against Bind directly.
- Consider splitting configure.ac into seperate files which do logically
similar tests. E.g move all the type detection stuff into one file,
entropy related stuff into another.
Packaging:
- HP-UX: Provide DEPOT package scripts.
(gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com)
PrivSep Issues:
- PAM
+ See above PAM notes
- AIX
+ usrinfo() does not set TTY, but only required for legacy systems. Works
with PrivSep.
- OSF
+ SIA is broken
- Cygwin
+ Privsep for Pre-auth only (no fd passing)
aclocal.m4 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
dnl OpenSSH-specific autoconf macros
dnl
dnl OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE(check_flag[, define_flag])
dnl Check that $CC accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append
dnl 'define_flag' to $CFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append
dnl 'check_flag'.
AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE], [{
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports compile flag $1])
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR $1"
_define_flag="$2"
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1"
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
exit(0);
}
]])],
[
if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
then
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ]
)
}])
dnl OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK(check_flag[, define_flag])
dnl Check that $CC accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append
dnl 'define_flag' to $CFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append
dnl 'check_flag'.
AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK], [{
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports compile flag $1 and linking succeeds])
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR $1"
_define_flag="$2"
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1"
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
long long int p = n * o;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
exit(0);
}
]])],
[
if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null`
then
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ]
)
}])
dnl OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK(check_flag[, define_flag])
dnl Check that $LD accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append
dnl 'define_flag' to $LDFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append
dnl 'check_flag'.
AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK], [{
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $LD supports link flag $1])
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR $1"
_define_flag="$2"
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1"
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
long long p = n * o;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
exit(0);
}
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" ]
)
}])
dnl OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(field, header, symbol)
dnl Does AC_EGREP_HEADER on 'header' for the string 'field'
dnl If found, set 'symbol' to be defined. Cache the result.
dnl TODO: This is not foolproof, better to compile and read from there
AC_DEFUN(OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD, [
# look for field '$1' in header '$2'
dnl This strips characters illegal to m4 from the header filename
ossh_safe=`echo "$2" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
dnl
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"$1
AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1 field in $2)
AC_CACHE_VAL($ossh_varname, [
AC_EGREP_HEADER($1, $2, [ dnl
eval "$ossh_varname=yes" dnl
], [ dnl
eval "$ossh_varname=no" dnl
]) dnl
])
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
AC_MSG_RESULT($ossh_result)
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
AC_DEFINE($3, 1, [Define if you have $1 in $2])
fi
else
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
fi
])
dnl Check for socklen_t: historically on BSD it is an int, and in
dnl POSIX 1g it is a type of its own, but some platforms use different
dnl types for the argument to getsockopt, getpeername, etc. So we
dnl have to test to find something that will work.
AC_DEFUN([TYPE_SOCKLEN_T],
[
AC_CHECK_TYPE([socklen_t], ,[
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for socklen_t equivalent])
AC_CACHE_VAL([curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv],
[
# Systems have either "struct sockaddr *" or
# "void *" as the second argument to getpeername
curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv=
for arg2 in "struct sockaddr" void; do
for t in int size_t unsigned long "unsigned long"; do
AC_TRY_COMPILE([
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int getpeername (int, $arg2 *, $t *);
],[
$t len;
getpeername(0,0,&len);
],[
curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv="$t"
break
])
done
done
if test "x$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" = x; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t])
fi
])
AC_MSG_RESULT($curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv)
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(socklen_t, $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv,
[type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined])],
[#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>])
])
addrmatch.c 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
This diff is collapsed. Click to expand it.
atomicio.c 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.28 2016/07/27 23:18:12 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2005 Anil Madhavapeddy. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
# include <sys/poll.h>
# endif
#endif
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "atomicio.h"
/*
* ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite
*/
size_t
atomicio6(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n,
int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *cb_arg)
{
char *s = _s;
size_t pos = 0;
ssize_t res;
struct pollfd pfd;
#ifndef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = f == read ? POLLIN : POLLOUT;
#endif
while (n > pos) {
res = (f) (fd, s + pos, n - pos);
switch (res) {
case -1:
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
#ifndef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON
(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
#endif
continue;
}
return 0;
case 0:
errno = EPIPE;
return pos;
default:
pos += (size_t)res;
if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, (size_t)res) == -1) {
errno = EINTR;
return pos;
}
}
}
return pos;
}
size_t
atomicio(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n)
{
return atomicio6(f, fd, _s, n, NULL, NULL);
}
/*
* ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==readv || f==writev
*/
size_t
atomiciov6(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd,
const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt,
int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *cb_arg)
{
size_t pos = 0, rem;
ssize_t res;
struct iovec iov_array[IOV_MAX], *iov = iov_array;
struct pollfd pfd;
if (iovcnt < 0 || iovcnt > IOV_MAX) {
errno = EINVAL;
return 0;
}
/* Make a copy of the iov array because we may modify it below */
memcpy(iov, _iov, (size_t)iovcnt * sizeof(*_iov));
#ifndef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = f == readv ? POLLIN : POLLOUT;
#endif
for (; iovcnt > 0 && iov[0].iov_len > 0;) {
res = (f) (fd, iov, iovcnt);
switch (res) {
case -1:
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
#ifndef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
#endif
continue;
}
return 0;
case 0:
errno = EPIPE;
return pos;
default:
rem = (size_t)res;
pos += rem;
/* skip completed iov entries */
while (iovcnt > 0 && rem >= iov[0].iov_len) {
rem -= iov[0].iov_len;
iov++;
iovcnt--;
}
/* This shouldn't happen... */
if (rem > 0 && (iovcnt <= 0 || rem > iov[0].iov_len)) {
errno = EFAULT;
return 0;
}
if (iovcnt == 0)
break;
/* update pointer in partially complete iov */
iov[0].iov_base = ((char *)iov[0].iov_base) + rem;
iov[0].iov_len -= rem;
}
if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, (size_t)res) == -1) {
errno = EINTR;
return pos;
}
}
return pos;
}
size_t
atomiciov(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd,
const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt)
{
return atomiciov6(f, fd, _iov, iovcnt, NULL, NULL);
}
atomicio.h 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.h,v 1.11 2010/09/22 22:58:51 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef _ATOMICIO_H
#define _ATOMICIO_H
/*
* Ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite
*/
size_t
atomicio6(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n,
int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *);
size_t atomicio(ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t), int, void *, size_t);
#define vwrite (ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t))write
/*
* ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==readv || f==writev
*/
size_t
atomiciov6(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd,
const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt, int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *);
size_t atomiciov(ssize_t (*)(int, const struct iovec *, int),
int, const struct iovec *, int);
#endif /* _ATOMICIO_H */
audit-bsm.c 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
This diff is collapsed. Click to expand it.
audit-linux.c 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
/*
* Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Use is subject to license terms.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
*/
#include "includes.h"
#if defined(USE_LINUX_AUDIT)
#include <libaudit.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "log.h"
#include "audit.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "packet.h"
const char *audit_username(void);
int
linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname,
const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
{
int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
if ((audit_fd = audit_open()) < 0) {
if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
else
return 0; /* Must prevent login */
}
rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
saved_errno = errno;
close(audit_fd);
/*
* Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
* root user.
*/
if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
rc = 0;
errno = saved_errno;
return rc >= 0;
}
/* Below is the sshd audit API code */
void
audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
{
/* not implemented */
}
void
audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
/* not implemented */
}
void
audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
{
if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, NULL,
li->line, 1) == 0)
fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
}
void
audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
{
/* not implemented */
}
void
audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
switch(event) {
case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
case SSH_NOLOGIN:
case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
break;
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
case SSH_INVALID_USER:
linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "sshd", 0);
break;
default:
debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
break;
}
}
#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
audit.c 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#include "audit.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
/*
* Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
* audit_connection_from() is called and MAY NOT be initialized when
* audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called. Test for NULL before using.
*/
extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
/* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */
ssh_audit_event_t
audit_classify_auth(const char *method)
{
if (strcmp(method, "none") == 0)
return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE;
else if (strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD;
else if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
strcmp(method, "rsa") == 0)
return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY;
else if (strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)
return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT;
else if (strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
strcmp(method, "rhosts-rsa") == 0)
return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED;
else if (strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI;
else
return SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
}
/* helper to return supplied username */
const char *
audit_username(void)
{
static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)";
static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)";
if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL)
return (unknownuser);
if (!the_authctxt->valid)
return (invaliduser);
return (the_authctxt->user);
}
const char *
audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
{
int i;
static struct event_lookup_struct {
ssh_audit_event_t event;
const char *name;
} event_lookup[] = {
{SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES, "LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES"},
{SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED, "LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED"},
{SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS, "AUTH_SUCCESS"},
{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE, "AUTH_FAIL_NONE"},
{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD, "AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD"},
{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT, "AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT"},
{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY, "AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY"},
{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED, "AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED"},
{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI, "AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI"},
{SSH_INVALID_USER, "INVALID_USER"},
{SSH_NOLOGIN, "NOLOGIN"},
{SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE, "CONNECTION_CLOSE"},
{SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON, "CONNECTION_ABANDON"},
{SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN, "AUDIT_UNKNOWN"}
};
for (i = 0; event_lookup[i].event != SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; i++)
if (event_lookup[i].event == ev)
break;
return(event_lookup[i].name);
}
# ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/*
* Null implementations of audit functions.
* These get used if SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled.
*/
/*
* Called after a connection has been accepted but before any authentication
* has been attempted.
*/
void
audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
{
debug("audit connection from %s port %d euid %d", host, port,
(int)geteuid());
}
/*
* Called when various events occur (see audit.h for a list of possible
* events and what they mean).
*/
void
audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
{
debug("audit event euid %d user %s event %d (%s)", geteuid(),
audit_username(), event, audit_event_lookup(event));
}
/*
* Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to
* the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
*
* Note that this may be called multiple times if multiple sessions are used
* within a single connection.
*/
void
audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
{
const char *t = li->line ? li->line : "(no tty)";
debug("audit session open euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(),
audit_username(), t);
}
/*
* Called when a user session is closed. Argument is the tty allocated to
* the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
*
* Note that this may be called multiple times if multiple sessions are used
* within a single connection.
*/
void
audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
{
const char *t = li->line ? li->line : "(no tty)";
debug("audit session close euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(),
audit_username(), t);
}
/*
* This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that
* it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
* multiple sessions within a single connection.
*/
void
audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
audit_username(), command);
}
# endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
audit.h 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef _SSH_AUDIT_H
# define _SSH_AUDIT_H
#include "loginrec.h"
enum ssh_audit_event_type {
SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,
SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,
SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS,
SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE,
SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,
SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT, /* keyboard-interactive or challenge-response */
SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY, /* ssh2 pubkey or ssh1 rsa */
SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED, /* ssh2 hostbased or ssh1 rhostsrsa */
SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI,
SSH_INVALID_USER,
SSH_NOLOGIN, /* denied by /etc/nologin, not implemented */
SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE, /* closed after attempting auth or session */
SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON, /* closed without completing auth */
SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
};
typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
void audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
void audit_run_command(const char *);
ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
auth-bsdauth.c 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
/* $OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.14 2015/10/20 23:24:25 mmcc Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
static void *
bsdauth_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
return authctxt;
}
int
bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
char *challenge = NULL;
*infotxt = NULL;
*numprompts = 0;
*prompts = NULL;
*echo_on = NULL;
if (authctxt->as != NULL) {
debug2("bsdauth_query: try reuse session");
challenge = auth_getitem(authctxt->as, AUTHV_CHALLENGE);
if (challenge == NULL) {
auth_close(authctxt->as);
authctxt->as = NULL;
}
}
if (challenge == NULL) {
debug2("bsdauth_query: new bsd auth session");
debug3("bsdauth_query: style %s",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "<default>");
authctxt->as = auth_userchallenge(authctxt->user,
authctxt->style, "auth-ssh", &challenge);
if (authctxt->as == NULL)
challenge = NULL;
debug2("bsdauth_query: <%s>", challenge ? challenge : "empty");
}
if (challenge == NULL)
return -1;
*name = xstrdup("");
*infotxt = xstrdup("");
*numprompts = 1;
*prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
*echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
(*prompts)[0] = xstrdup(challenge);
return 0;
}
int
bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
int authok;
if (!authctxt->valid)
return -1;
if (authctxt->as == NULL)
error("bsdauth_respond: no bsd auth session");
if (numresponses != 1)
return -1;
authok = auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, responses[0], 0);
authctxt->as = NULL;
debug3("bsdauth_respond: <%s> = <%d>", responses[0], authok);
return (authok == 0) ? -1 : 0;
}
static void
bsdauth_free_ctx(void *ctx)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
if (authctxt && authctxt->as) {
auth_close(authctxt->as);
authctxt->as = NULL;
}
}
KbdintDevice bsdauth_device = {
"bsdauth",
bsdauth_init_ctx,
bsdauth_query,
bsdauth_respond,
bsdauth_free_ctx
};
KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device = {
"bsdauth",
bsdauth_init_ctx,
mm_bsdauth_query,
mm_bsdauth_respond,
bsdauth_free_ctx
};
#endif
auth-krb5.c 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
/* $OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.22 2016/05/04 14:22:33 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Kerberos v5 authentication and ticket-passing routines.
*
* From: FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c,v 1.6 2001/02/13 16:58:04 assar
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Daniel Kouril. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#ifdef KRB5
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <krb5.h>
extern ServerOptions options;
static int
krb5_init(void *context)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context;
krb5_error_code problem;
if (authctxt->krb5_ctx == NULL) {
problem = krb5_init_context(&authctxt->krb5_ctx);
if (problem)
return (problem);
}
return (0);
}
int
auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
{
#ifndef HEIMDAL
krb5_creds creds;
krb5_principal server;
#endif
krb5_error_code problem;
krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
int len;
char *client, *platform_client;
const char *errmsg;
/* get platform-specific kerberos client principal name (if it exists) */
platform_client = platform_krb5_get_principal_name(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
client = platform_client ? platform_client : authctxt->pw->pw_name;
temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
problem = krb5_init(authctxt);
if (problem)
goto out;
problem = krb5_parse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, client,
&authctxt->krb5_user);
if (problem)
goto out;
#ifdef HEIMDAL
# ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
krb5_mcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &ccache);
# else
problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_mcc_ops, &ccache);
# endif
if (problem)
goto out;
problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache,
authctxt->krb5_user);
if (problem)
goto out;
restore_uid();
problem = krb5_verify_user(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
ccache, password, 1, NULL);
temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
if (problem)
goto out;
# ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
krb5_fcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
# else
problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_fcc_ops,
&authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
# endif
if (problem)
goto out;
problem = krb5_cc_copy_cache(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache,
authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache);
ccache = NULL;
if (problem)
goto out;
#else
problem = krb5_get_init_creds_password(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds,
authctxt->krb5_user, (char *)password, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
if (problem)
goto out;
problem = krb5_sname_to_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, NULL, NULL,
KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server);
if (problem)
goto out;
restore_uid();
problem = krb5_verify_init_creds(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds, server,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, server);
temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
if (problem)
goto out;
if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
authctxt->pw->pw_name)) {
problem = -1;
goto out;
}
problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
if (problem)
goto out;
problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
authctxt->krb5_user);
if (problem)
goto out;
problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
&creds);
if (problem)
goto out;
#endif
authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
#endif
out:
restore_uid();
free(platform_client);
if (problem) {
if (ccache)
krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache);
if (authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL && problem!=-1) {
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
problem);
debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %s",
errmsg);
krb5_free_error_message(authctxt->krb5_ctx, errmsg);
} else
debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %d",
problem);
krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
if (options.kerberos_or_local_passwd)
return (-1);
else
return (0);
}
return (authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0);
}
void
krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called");
if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) {
krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL;
}
if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
}
if (authctxt->krb5_ctx) {
krb5_free_context(authctxt->krb5_ctx);
authctxt->krb5_ctx = NULL;
}
}
#ifndef HEIMDAL
krb5_error_code
ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
char ccname[40];
mode_t old_umask;
ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
"FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
return ENOMEM;
old_umask = umask(0177);
tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
oerrno = errno;
umask(old_umask);
if (tmpfd == -1) {
logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
return oerrno;
}
if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
oerrno = errno;
logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
close(tmpfd);
return oerrno;
}
close(tmpfd);
return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
}
#endif /* !HEIMDAL */
#endif /* KRB5 */
auth-options.c 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
This diff is collapsed. Click to expand it.
auth-options.h 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.22 2016/11/30 02:57:40 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#ifndef AUTH_OPTIONS_H
#define AUTH_OPTIONS_H
/* Linked list of custom environment strings */
struct envstring {
struct envstring *next;
char *s;
};
/* Flags that may be set in authorized_keys options. */
extern int no_port_forwarding_flag;
extern int no_agent_forwarding_flag;
extern int no_x11_forwarding_flag;
extern int no_pty_flag;
extern int no_user_rc;
extern char *forced_command;
extern struct envstring *custom_environment;
extern int forced_tun_device;
extern int key_is_cert_authority;
extern char *authorized_principals;
int auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, char *, u_long);
void auth_clear_options(void);
int auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *, struct passwd *, const char **);
#endif
auth-pam.c 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
This diff is collapsed. Click to expand it.
auth-pam.h 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef USE_PAM
void start_pam(Authctxt *);
void finish_pam(void);
u_int do_pam_account(void);
void do_pam_session(void);
void do_pam_setcred(int );
void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
void free_pam_environment(char **);
void sshpam_thread_cleanup(void);
void sshpam_cleanup(void);
int sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
int sshpam_get_maxtries_reached(void);
void sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(int);
int is_pam_session_open(void);
#endif /* USE_PAM */
auth-passwd.c 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
/* $OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.45 2016/07/21 01:39:35 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Password authentication. This file contains the functions to check whether
* the password is valid for the user.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "packet.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
extern Buffer loginmsg;
extern ServerOptions options;
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
extern login_cap_t *lc;
#endif
#define DAY (24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
#define TWO_WEEKS (2L * 7 * DAY) /* 2 weeks in seconds */
#define MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 1024
void
disable_forwarding(void)
{
no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
}
/*
* Tries to authenticate the user using password. Returns true if
* authentication succeeds.
*/
int
auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
{
struct passwd * pw = authctxt->pw;
int result, ok = authctxt->valid;
#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
static int expire_checked = 0;
#endif
if (strlen(password) > MAX_PASSWORD_LEN)
return 0;
#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)
ok = 0;
#endif
if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0)
return 0;
#ifdef KRB5
if (options.kerberos_authentication == 1) {
int ret = auth_krb5_password(authctxt, password);
if (ret == 1 || ret == 0)
return ret && ok;
/* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
{
HANDLE hToken = cygwin_logon_user(pw, password);
if (hToken == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
return 0;
cygwin_set_impersonation_token(hToken);
return ok;
}
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
return (sshpam_auth_passwd(authctxt, password) && ok);
#endif
#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
if (!expire_checked) {
expire_checked = 1;
if (auth_shadow_pwexpired(authctxt))
authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
}
#endif
result = sys_auth_passwd(authctxt, password);
if (authctxt->force_pwchange)
disable_forwarding();
return (result && ok);
}
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
static void
warn_expiry(Authctxt *authctxt, auth_session_t *as)
{
char buf[256];
quad_t pwtimeleft, actimeleft, daysleft, pwwarntime, acwarntime;
pwwarntime = acwarntime = TWO_WEEKS;
pwtimeleft = auth_check_change(as);
actimeleft = auth_check_expire(as);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (authctxt->valid) {
pwwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "password-warn", TWO_WEEKS,
TWO_WEEKS);
acwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "expire-warn", TWO_WEEKS,
TWO_WEEKS);
}
#endif
if (pwtimeleft != 0 && pwtimeleft < pwwarntime) {
daysleft = pwtimeleft / DAY + 1;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"Your password will expire in %lld day%s.\n",
daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
}
if (actimeleft != 0 && actimeleft < acwarntime) {
daysleft = actimeleft / DAY + 1;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"Your account will expire in %lld day%s.\n",
daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
}
}
int
sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
{
struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
auth_session_t *as;
static int expire_checked = 0;
as = auth_usercheck(pw->pw_name, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh",
(char *)password);
if (as == NULL)
return (0);
if (auth_getstate(as) & AUTH_PWEXPIRED) {
auth_close(as);
disable_forwarding();
authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
return (1);
} else {
if (!expire_checked) {
expire_checked = 1;
warn_expiry(authctxt, as);
}
return (auth_close(as));
}
}
#elif !defined(CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD)
int
sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
{
struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
char *encrypted_password, *salt = NULL;
/* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
/* Check for users with no password. */
if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
return (1);
/*
* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt, or pass a
* NULL and let xcrypt pick one.
*/
if (authctxt->valid && pw_password[0] && pw_password[1])
salt = pw_password;
encrypted_password = xcrypt(password, salt);
/*
* Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
* are identical.
*/
return encrypted_password != NULL &&
strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password) == 0;
}
#endif
auth-rhosts.c 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.48 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Rhosts authentication. This file contains code to check whether to admit
* the login based on rhosts authentication. This file also processes
* /etc/hosts.equiv.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP_H
# include <netgroup.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "packet.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "buffer.h" /* XXX */
#include "key.h" /* XXX */
#include "servconf.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern int use_privsep;
/*
* This function processes an rhosts-style file (.rhosts, .shosts, or
* /etc/hosts.equiv). This returns true if authentication can be granted
* based on the file, and returns zero otherwise.
*/
static int
check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
const char *ipaddr, const char *client_user,
const char *server_user)
{
FILE *f;
#define RBUFLN 1024
char buf[RBUFLN];/* Must not be larger than host, user, dummy below. */
int fd;
struct stat st;
/* Open the .rhosts file, deny if unreadable */
if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1)
return 0;
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
close(fd);
return 0;
}
if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
logit("User %s hosts file %s is not a regular file",
server_user, filename);
close(fd);
return 0;
}
unset_nonblock(fd);
if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
close(fd);
return 0;
}
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
/* All three must have length >= buf to avoid overflows. */
char hostbuf[RBUFLN], userbuf[RBUFLN], dummy[RBUFLN];
char *host, *user, *cp;
int negated;
for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\n' || !*cp)
continue;
/*
* NO_PLUS is supported at least on OSF/1. We skip it (we
* don't ever support the plus syntax).
*/
if (strncmp(cp, "NO_PLUS", 7) == 0)
continue;
/*
* This should be safe because each buffer is as big as the
* whole string, and thus cannot be overwritten.
*/
switch (sscanf(buf, "%1023s %1023s %1023s", hostbuf, userbuf,
dummy)) {
case 0:
auth_debug_add("Found empty line in %.100s.", filename);
continue;
case 1:
/* Host name only. */
strlcpy(userbuf, server_user, sizeof(userbuf));
break;
case 2:
/* Got both host and user name. */
break;
case 3:
auth_debug_add("Found garbage in %.100s.", filename);
continue;
default:
/* Weird... */
continue;
}
host = hostbuf;
user = userbuf;
negated = 0;
/* Process negated host names, or positive netgroups. */
if (host[0] == '-') {
negated = 1;
host++;
} else if (host[0] == '+')
host++;
if (user[0] == '-') {
negated = 1;
user++;
} else if (user[0] == '+')
user++;
/* Check for empty host/user names (particularly '+'). */
if (!host[0] || !user[0]) {
/* We come here if either was '+' or '-'. */
auth_debug_add("Ignoring wild host/user names "
"in %.100s.", filename);
continue;
}
/* Verify that host name matches. */
if (host[0] == '@') {
if (!innetgr(host + 1, hostname, NULL, NULL) &&
!innetgr(host + 1, ipaddr, NULL, NULL))
continue;
} else if (strcasecmp(host, hostname) &&
strcmp(host, ipaddr) != 0)
continue; /* Different hostname. */
/* Verify that user name matches. */
if (user[0] == '@') {
if (!innetgr(user + 1, NULL, client_user, NULL))
continue;
} else if (strcmp(user, client_user) != 0)
continue; /* Different username. */
/* Found the user and host. */
fclose(f);
/* If the entry was negated, deny access. */
if (negated) {
auth_debug_add("Matched negative entry in %.100s.",
filename);
return 0;
}
/* Accept authentication. */
return 1;
}
/* Authentication using this file denied. */
fclose(f);
return 0;
}
/*
* Tries to authenticate the user using the .shosts or .rhosts file. Returns
* true if authentication succeeds. If ignore_rhosts is true, only
* /etc/hosts.equiv will be considered (.rhosts and .shosts are ignored).
*/
int
auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
const char *ipaddr)
{
char buf[1024];
struct stat st;
static const char *rhosts_files[] = {".shosts", ".rhosts", NULL};
u_int rhosts_file_index;
debug2("auth_rhosts2: clientuser %s hostname %s ipaddr %s",
client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
/* Switch to the user's uid. */
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
/*
* Quick check: if the user has no .shosts or .rhosts files and
* no system hosts.equiv/shosts.equiv files exist then return
* failure immediately without doing costly lookups from name
* servers.
*/
for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
rhosts_file_index++) {
/* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
break;
}
/* Switch back to privileged uid. */
restore_uid();
/*
* Deny if The user has no .shosts or .rhosts file and there
* are no system-wide files.
*/
if (!rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index] &&
stat(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0 &&
stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0) {
debug3("%s: no hosts access files exist", __func__);
return 0;
}
/*
* If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and
* shosts.equiv.
*/
if (pw->pw_uid == 0)
debug3("%s: root user, ignoring system hosts files", __func__);
else {
if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by "
"/etc/hosts.equiv.", hostname, ipaddr);
return 1;
}
if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by "
"%.100s.", hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV);
return 1;
}
}
/*
* Check that the home directory is owned by root or the user, and is
* not group or world writable.
*/
if (stat(pw->pw_dir, &st) < 0) {
logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
"no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
"no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
return 0;
}
if (options.strict_modes &&
((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
"bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
"bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
return 0;
}
/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
/* Check all .rhosts files (currently .shosts and .rhosts). */
for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
rhosts_file_index++) {
/* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
continue;
/*
* Make sure that the file is either owned by the user or by
* root, and make sure it is not writable by anyone but the
* owner. This is to help avoid novices accidentally
* allowing access to their account by anyone.
*/
if (options.strict_modes &&
((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s",
pw->pw_name, buf);
auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf);
continue;
}
/*
* Check if we have been configured to ignore .rhosts
* and .shosts files.
*/
if (options.ignore_rhosts) {
auth_debug_add("Server has been configured to "
"ignore %.100s.", rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
continue;
}
/* Check if authentication is permitted by the file. */
if (check_rhosts_file(buf, hostname, ipaddr,
client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
auth_debug_add("Accepted by %.100s.",
rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
/* Restore the privileged uid. */
restore_uid();
auth_debug_add("Accepted host %s ip %s client_user "
"%s server_user %s", hostname, ipaddr,
client_user, pw->pw_name);
return 1;
}
}
/* Restore the privileged uid. */
restore_uid();
return 0;
}
auth-shadow.c 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
#include <shadow.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "log.h"
#ifdef DAY
# undef DAY
#endif
#define DAY (24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
extern Buffer loginmsg;
/*
* For the account and password expiration functions, we assume the expiry
* occurs the day after the day specified.
*/
/*
* Check if specified account is expired. Returns 1 if account is expired,
* 0 otherwise.
*/
int
auth_shadow_acctexpired(struct spwd *spw)
{
time_t today;
int daysleft;
char buf[256];
today = time(NULL) / DAY;
daysleft = spw->sp_expire - today;
debug3("%s: today %d sp_expire %d days left %d", __func__, (int)today,
(int)spw->sp_expire, daysleft);
if (spw->sp_expire == -1) {
debug3("account expiration disabled");
} else if (daysleft < 0) {
logit("Account %.100s has expired", spw->sp_namp);
return 1;
} else if (daysleft <= spw->sp_warn) {
debug3("account will expire in %d days", daysleft);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"Your account will expire in %d day%s.\n", daysleft,
daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Checks password expiry for platforms that use shadow passwd files.
* Returns: 1 = password expired, 0 = password not expired
*/
int
auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *ctxt)
{
struct spwd *spw = NULL;
const char *user = ctxt->pw->pw_name;
char buf[256];
time_t today;
int daysleft, disabled = 0;
if ((spw = getspnam((char *)user)) == NULL) {
error("Could not get shadow information for %.100s", user);
return 0;
}
today = time(NULL) / DAY;
debug3("%s: today %d sp_lstchg %d sp_max %d", __func__, (int)today,
(int)spw->sp_lstchg, (int)spw->sp_max);
#if defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
if (iscomsec()) {
struct pr_passwd *pr;
pr = getprpwnam((char *)user);
/* Test for Trusted Mode expiry disabled */
if (pr != NULL && pr->ufld.fd_min == 0 &&
pr->ufld.fd_lifetime == 0 && pr->ufld.fd_expire == 0 &&
pr->ufld.fd_pw_expire_warning == 0 &&
pr->ufld.fd_schange != 0)
disabled = 1;
}
#endif
/* TODO: check sp_inact */
daysleft = spw->sp_lstchg + spw->sp_max - today;
if (disabled) {
debug3("password expiration disabled");
} else if (spw->sp_lstchg == 0) {
logit("User %.100s password has expired (root forced)", user);
return 1;
} else if (spw->sp_max == -1) {
debug3("password expiration disabled");
} else if (daysleft < 0) {
logit("User %.100s password has expired (password aged)", user);
return 1;
} else if (daysleft <= spw->sp_warn) {
debug3("password will expire in %d days", daysleft);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"Your password will expire in %d day%s.\n", daysleft,
daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s");
buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf));
}
return 0;
}
#endif /* USE_SHADOW && HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
auth-sia.c 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Chris Adams. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
#include <sia.h>
#include <siad.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <setjmp.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "ssh.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-sia.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
extern int saved_argc;
extern char **saved_argv;
int
sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *pass)
{
int ret;
SIAENTITY *ent = NULL;
const char *host;
host = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
if (!authctxt->user || pass == NULL || pass[0] == '\0')
return (0);
if (sia_ses_init(&ent, saved_argc, saved_argv, host, authctxt->user,
NULL, 0, NULL) != SIASUCCESS)
return (0);
if ((ret = sia_ses_authent(NULL, pass, ent)) != SIASUCCESS) {
error("Couldn't authenticate %s from %s",
authctxt->user, host);
if (ret & SIASTOP)
sia_ses_release(&ent);
return (0);
}
sia_ses_release(&ent);
return (1);
}
void
session_setup_sia(struct passwd *pw, char *tty)
{
SIAENTITY *ent = NULL;
const char *host;
host = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
if (sia_ses_init(&ent, saved_argc, saved_argv, host, pw->pw_name,
tty, 0, NULL) != SIASUCCESS)
fatal("sia_ses_init failed");
if (sia_make_entity_pwd(pw, ent) != SIASUCCESS) {
sia_ses_release(&ent);
fatal("sia_make_entity_pwd failed");
}
ent->authtype = SIA_A_NONE;
if (sia_ses_estab(sia_collect_trm, ent) != SIASUCCESS)
fatal("Couldn't establish session for %s from %s",
pw->pw_name, host);
if (sia_ses_launch(sia_collect_trm, ent) != SIASUCCESS)
fatal("Couldn't launch session for %s from %s",
pw->pw_name, host);
sia_ses_release(&ent);
setuid(0);
permanently_set_uid(pw);
}
#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
auth-sia.h 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Chris Adams. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
void session_setup_sia(struct passwd *, char *);
#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
auth-skey.c 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
/* $OpenBSD: auth-skey.c,v 1.27 2007/01/21 01:41:54 stevesk Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef SKEY
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <skey.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
static void *
skey_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
return authctxt;
}
int
skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
u_int* numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
char challenge[1024];
struct skey skey;
if (_compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge,
sizeof(challenge)) == -1)
return -1;
*name = xstrdup("");
*infotxt = xstrdup("");
*numprompts = 1;
*prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
*echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
xasprintf(*prompts, "%s%s", challenge, SKEY_PROMPT);
return 0;
}
int
skey_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
if (authctxt->valid &&
numresponses == 1 &&
skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, responses[0]) != -1)
return 0;
return -1;
}
static void
skey_free_ctx(void *ctx)
{
/* we don't have a special context */
}
KbdintDevice skey_device = {
"skey",
skey_init_ctx,
skey_query,
skey_respond,
skey_free_ctx
};
KbdintDevice mm_skey_device = {
"skey",
skey_init_ctx,
mm_skey_query,
mm_skey_respond,
skey_free_ctx
};
#endif /* SKEY */
auth.c 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
This diff is collapsed. Click to expand it.
auth.h 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.89 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
#ifndef AUTH_H
#define AUTH_H
#include <signal.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
#include <login_cap.h>
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
#include <bsd_auth.h>
#endif
#ifdef KRB5
#include <krb5.h>
#endif
struct ssh;
struct sshkey;
typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt;
typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod;
typedef struct KbdintDevice KbdintDevice;
struct Authctxt {
sig_atomic_t success;
int authenticated; /* authenticated and alarms cancelled */
int postponed; /* authentication needs another step */
int valid; /* user exists and is allowed to login */
int attempt;
int failures;
int server_caused_failure;
int force_pwchange;
char *user; /* username sent by the client */
char *service;
struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */
char *style;
void *kbdintctxt;
char *info; /* Extra info for next auth_log */
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
auth_session_t *as;
#endif
char **auth_methods; /* modified from server config */
u_int num_auth_methods;
#ifdef KRB5
krb5_context krb5_ctx;
krb5_ccache krb5_fwd_ccache;
krb5_principal krb5_user;
char *krb5_ticket_file;
char *krb5_ccname;
#endif
Buffer *loginmsg;
void *methoddata;
struct sshkey **prev_userkeys;
u_int nprev_userkeys;
};
/*
* Every authentication method has to handle authentication requests for
* non-existing users, or for users that are not allowed to login. In this
* case 'valid' is set to 0, but 'user' points to the username requested by
* the client.
*/
struct Authmethod {
char *name;
int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt);
int *enabled;
};
/*
* Keyboard interactive device:
* init_ctx returns: non NULL upon success
* query returns: 0 - success, otherwise failure
* respond returns: 0 - success, 1 - need further interaction,
* otherwise - failure
*/
struct KbdintDevice
{
const char *name;
void* (*init_ctx)(Authctxt*);
int (*query)(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on);
int (*respond)(void *ctx, u_int numresp, char **responses);
void (*free_ctx)(void *ctx);
};
int
auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
int auth_password(Authctxt *, const char *);
int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int);
void pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *, const Key *, const char *, ...)
__attribute__((__format__ (printf, 3, 4)));
void auth2_record_userkey(Authctxt *, struct sshkey *);
int auth2_userkey_already_used(Authctxt *, struct sshkey *);
struct stat;
int auth_secure_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t,
char *, size_t);
#ifdef KRB5
int auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *);
int auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt);
int auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password);
void krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt);
#endif /* KRB5 */
#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
#include <shadow.h>
int auth_shadow_acctexpired(struct spwd *);
int auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *);
#endif
#include "auth-pam.h"
#include "audit.h"
void remove_kbdint_device(const char *);
void disable_forwarding(void);
void do_authentication2(Authctxt *);
void auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *, ...)
__attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)))
__attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
void auth_log(Authctxt *, int, int, const char *, const char *);
void auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *) __attribute__((noreturn));
void userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, const char *, const char *);
int auth_root_allowed(const char *);
void userauth_send_banner(const char *);
char *auth2_read_banner(void);
int auth2_methods_valid(const char *, int);
int auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *);
int auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *);
int auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *);
void privsep_challenge_enable(void);
int auth2_challenge(Authctxt *, char *);
void auth2_challenge_stop(Authctxt *);
int bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
int bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
int skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
int skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
int allowed_user(struct passwd *);
struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user);
char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
int auth_key_is_revoked(Key *);
const char *auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *, int);
HostStatus
check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *,
const char *, const char *);
/* hostkey handling */
Key *get_hostkey_by_index(int);
Key *get_hostkey_public_by_index(int, struct ssh *);
Key *get_hostkey_public_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *);
Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *);
int get_hostkey_index(Key *, int, struct ssh *);
int sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, size_t *,
const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
/* debug messages during authentication */
void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
void auth_debug_send(void);
void auth_debug_reset(void);
struct passwd *fakepw(void);
int sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
#define SKEY_PROMPT "\nS/Key Password: "
#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
#include <krb5.h>
krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
#endif
#endif
auth2-chall.c 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.44 2016/05/02 08:49:03 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
static int auth2_challenge_start(Authctxt *);
static int send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *);
static int input_userauth_info_response(int, u_int32_t, void *);
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
extern KbdintDevice bsdauth_device;
#else
#ifdef USE_PAM
extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
#endif
#ifdef SKEY
extern KbdintDevice skey_device;
#endif
#endif
KbdintDevice *devices[] = {
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
&bsdauth_device,
#else
#ifdef USE_PAM
&sshpam_device,
#endif
#ifdef SKEY
&skey_device,
#endif
#endif
NULL
};
typedef struct KbdintAuthctxt KbdintAuthctxt;
struct KbdintAuthctxt
{
char *devices;
void *ctxt;
KbdintDevice *device;
u_int nreq;
u_int devices_done;
};
#ifdef USE_PAM
void
remove_kbdint_device(const char *devname)
{
int i, j;
for (i = 0; devices[i] != NULL; i++)
if (strcmp(devices[i]->name, devname) == 0) {
for (j = i; devices[j] != NULL; j++)
devices[j] = devices[j+1];
i--;
}
}
#endif
static KbdintAuthctxt *
kbdint_alloc(const char *devs)
{
KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
Buffer b;
int i;
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (!options.use_pam)
remove_kbdint_device("pam");
#endif
kbdintctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(KbdintAuthctxt));
if (strcmp(devs, "") == 0) {
buffer_init(&b);
for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) {
if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
buffer_append(&b, devices[i]->name,
strlen(devices[i]->name));
}
if ((kbdintctxt->devices = sshbuf_dup_string(&b)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
buffer_free(&b);
} else {
kbdintctxt->devices = xstrdup(devs);
}
debug("kbdint_alloc: devices '%s'", kbdintctxt->devices);
kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL;
kbdintctxt->device = NULL;
kbdintctxt->nreq = 0;
return kbdintctxt;
}
static void
kbdint_reset_device(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
{
if (kbdintctxt->ctxt) {
kbdintctxt->device->free_ctx(kbdintctxt->ctxt);
kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL;
}
kbdintctxt->device = NULL;
}
static void
kbdint_free(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
{
if (kbdintctxt->device)
kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt);
free(kbdintctxt->devices);
explicit_bzero(kbdintctxt, sizeof(*kbdintctxt));
free(kbdintctxt);
}
/* get next device */
static int
kbdint_next_device(Authctxt *authctxt, KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
{
size_t len;
char *t;
int i;
if (kbdintctxt->device)
kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt);
do {
len = kbdintctxt->devices ?
strcspn(kbdintctxt->devices, ",") : 0;
if (len == 0)
break;
for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) {
if ((kbdintctxt->devices_done & (1 << i)) != 0 ||
!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt,
"keyboard-interactive", devices[i]->name))
continue;
if (strncmp(kbdintctxt->devices, devices[i]->name,
len) == 0) {
kbdintctxt->device = devices[i];
kbdintctxt->devices_done |= 1 << i;
}
}
t = kbdintctxt->devices;
kbdintctxt->devices = t[len] ? xstrdup(t+len+1) : NULL;
free(t);
debug2("kbdint_next_device: devices %s", kbdintctxt->devices ?
kbdintctxt->devices : "<empty>");
} while (kbdintctxt->devices && !kbdintctxt->device);
return kbdintctxt->device ? 1 : 0;
}
/*
* try challenge-response, set authctxt->postponed if we have to
* wait for the response.
*/
int
auth2_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt, char *devs)
{
debug("auth2_challenge: user=%s devs=%s",
authctxt->user ? authctxt->user : "<nouser>",
devs ? devs : "<no devs>");
if (authctxt->user == NULL || !devs)
return 0;
if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL)
authctxt->kbdintctxt = kbdint_alloc(devs);
return auth2_challenge_start(authctxt);
}
/* unregister kbd-int callbacks and context */
void
auth2_challenge_stop(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
/* unregister callback */
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, NULL);
if (authctxt->kbdintctxt != NULL) {
kbdint_free(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
}
}
/* side effect: sets authctxt->postponed if a reply was sent*/
static int
auth2_challenge_start(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
debug2("auth2_challenge_start: devices %s",
kbdintctxt->devices ? kbdintctxt->devices : "<empty>");
if (kbdint_next_device(authctxt, kbdintctxt) == 0) {
auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
return 0;
}
debug("auth2_challenge_start: trying authentication method '%s'",
kbdintctxt->device->name);
if ((kbdintctxt->ctxt = kbdintctxt->device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL) {
auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
return 0;
}
if (send_userauth_info_request(authctxt) == 0) {
auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
return 0;
}
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE,
&input_userauth_info_response);
authctxt->postponed = 1;
return 0;
}
static int
send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
char *name, *instr, **prompts;
u_int i, *echo_on;
kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
if (kbdintctxt->device->query(kbdintctxt->ctxt,
&name, &instr, &kbdintctxt->nreq, &prompts, &echo_on))
return 0;
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST);
packet_put_cstring(name);
packet_put_cstring(instr);
packet_put_cstring(""); /* language not used */
packet_put_int(kbdintctxt->nreq);
for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++) {
packet_put_cstring(prompts[i]);
packet_put_char(echo_on[i]);
}
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++)
free(prompts[i]);
free(prompts);
free(echo_on);
free(name);
free(instr);
return 1;
}
static int
input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
int authenticated = 0, res;
u_int i, nresp;
const char *devicename = NULL;
char **response = NULL;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no authctxt");
kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
if (kbdintctxt == NULL || kbdintctxt->ctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no kbdintctxt");
if (kbdintctxt->device == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no device");
authctxt->postponed = 0; /* reset */
nresp = packet_get_int();
if (nresp != kbdintctxt->nreq)
fatal("input_userauth_info_response: wrong number of replies");
if (nresp > 100)
fatal("input_userauth_info_response: too many replies");
if (nresp > 0) {
response = xcalloc(nresp, sizeof(char *));
for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++)
response[i] = packet_get_string(NULL);
}
packet_check_eom();
res = kbdintctxt->device->respond(kbdintctxt->ctxt, nresp, response);
for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) {
explicit_bzero(response[i], strlen(response[i]));
free(response[i]);
}
free(response);
switch (res) {
case 0:
/* Success! */
authenticated = authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0;
break;
case 1:
/* Authentication needs further interaction */
if (send_userauth_info_request(authctxt) == 1)
authctxt->postponed = 1;
break;
default:
/* Failure! */
break;
}
devicename = kbdintctxt->device->name;
if (!authctxt->postponed) {
if (authenticated) {
auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
} else {
/* start next device */
/* may set authctxt->postponed */
auth2_challenge_start(authctxt);
}
}
userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "keyboard-interactive",
devicename);
return 0;
}
void
privsep_challenge_enable(void)
{
#if defined(BSD_AUTH) || defined(USE_PAM) || defined(SKEY)
int n = 0;
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
extern KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device;
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
extern KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device;
#endif
#ifdef SKEY
extern KbdintDevice mm_skey_device;
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
devices[n++] = &mm_bsdauth_device;
#else
#ifdef USE_PAM
devices[n++] = &mm_sshpam_device;
#endif
#ifdef SKEY
devices[n++] = &mm_skey_device;
#endif
#endif
}
auth2-gss.c 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.22 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
/*
* We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
* how to check local user kuserok and the like)
*/
static int
userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
gss_OID_desc goid = {0, NULL};
Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
int mechs;
int present;
OM_uint32 ms;
u_int len;
u_char *doid = NULL;
if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL)
return (0);
mechs = packet_get_int();
if (mechs == 0) {
debug("Mechanism negotiation is not supported");
return (0);
}
do {
mechs--;
free(doid);
present = 0;
doid = packet_get_string(&len);
if (len > 2 && doid[0] == SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE &&
doid[1] == len - 2) {
goid.elements = doid + 2;
goid.length = len - 2;
ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(&ms, &goid, &present);
} else {
logit("Badly formed OID received");
}
} while (mechs > 0 && !present);
if (!present) {
free(doid);
authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
return (0);
}
if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid)))) {
if (ctxt != NULL)
ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
free(doid);
authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
return (0);
}
authctxt->methoddata = (void *)ctxt;
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE);
/* Return the OID that we received */
packet_put_string(doid, len);
packet_send();
free(doid);
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token);
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok);
authctxt->postponed = 1;
return (0);
}
static int
input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt;
gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, flags;
u_int len;
if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len);
recv_tok.length = len; /* u_int vs. size_t */
packet_check_eom();
maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
&send_tok, &flags));
free(recv_tok.value);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
if (send_tok.length != 0) {
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK);
packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
packet_send();
}
authctxt->postponed = 0;
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
userauth_finish(authctxt, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
} else {
if (send_tok.length != 0) {
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
packet_send();
}
if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC,
&input_gssapi_mic);
else
dispatch_set(
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,
&input_gssapi_exchange_complete);
}
}
gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
return 0;
}
static int
input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt;
gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
OM_uint32 maj_status;
u_int len;
if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len);
recv_tok.length = len;
packet_check_eom();
/* Push the error token into GSSAPI to see what it says */
maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
&send_tok, NULL));
free(recv_tok.value);
/* We can't return anything to the client, even if we wanted to */
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
/* The client will have already moved on to the next auth */
gss_release_buffer(&maj_status, &send_tok);
return 0;
}
/*
* This is called when the client thinks we've completed authentication.
* It should only be enabled in the dispatch handler by the function above,
* which only enables it once the GSSAPI exchange is complete.
*/
static int
input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
int authenticated;
if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
/*
* We don't need to check the status, because we're only enabled in
* the dispatcher once the exchange is complete
*/
packet_check_eom();
authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
authctxt->postponed = 0;
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
return 0;
}
static int
input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt;
int authenticated = 0;
Buffer b;
gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
u_int len;
if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
mic.length = len;
ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
"gssapi-with-mic");
gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
else
logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
buffer_free(&b);
free(mic.value);
authctxt->postponed = 0;
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
return 0;
}
Authmethod method_gssapi = {
"gssapi-with-mic",
userauth_gssapi,
&options.gss_authentication
};
#endif /* GSSAPI */
auth2-hostbased.c 0 → 100644
View file @ b1b8ac2b
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.26 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "match.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern u_char *session_id2;
extern u_int session_id2_len;
static int
userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
Buffer b;
Key *key = NULL;
char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost, *service;
u_char *pkblob, *sig;
u_int alen, blen, slen;
int pktype;
int authenticated = 0;
if (!authctxt->valid) {
debug2("userauth_hostbased: disabled because of invalid user");
return 0;
}
pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
chost = packet_get_string(NULL);
cuser = packet_get_string(NULL);
sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
debug("userauth_hostbased: cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %d",
cuser, chost, pkalg, slen);
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
debug("signature:");
buffer_init(&b);
buffer_append(&b, sig, slen);
buffer_dump(&b);
buffer_free(&b);
#endif
pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
/* this is perfectly legal */
logit("userauth_hostbased: unsupported "
"public key algorithm: %s", pkalg);
goto done;
}
key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
if (key == NULL) {
error("userauth_hostbased: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
error("userauth_hostbased: type mismatch for decoded key "
"(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
error("Refusing RSA key because peer uses unsafe "
"signature format");
goto done;
}
if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
options.hostbased_key_types, 0) != 1) {
logit("%s: key type %s not in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes",
__func__, sshkey_type(key));
goto done;
}
service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" :
authctxt->service;
buffer_init(&b);
buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
/* reconstruct packet */
buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, service);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased");
buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen);
buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, chost);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, cuser);
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
buffer_dump(&b);
#endif
pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
"client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost);
/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
authenticated = 1;
buffer_free(&b);
done:
debug2("userauth_hostbased: authenticated %d", authenticated);
if (key != NULL)
key_free(key);
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
free(cuser);
free(chost);
free(sig);
return authenticated;
}
/* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
int
hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
Key *key)
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason;
HostStatus host_status;
int len;
char *fp;
if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
return 0;
resolvedname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
debug2("%s: chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s", __func__,
chost, resolvedname, ipaddr);
if (((len = strlen(chost)) > 0) && chost[len - 1] == '.') {
debug2("stripping trailing dot from chost %s", chost);
chost[len - 1] = '\0';
}
if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) {
if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0) {
debug2("%s: auth_rhosts2 refused "
"user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" (from packet)",
__func__, cuser, chost);
return 0;
}
lookup = chost;
} else {
if (strcasecmp(resolvedname, chost) != 0)
logit("userauth_hostbased mismatch: "
"client sends %s, but we resolve %s to %s",
chost, ipaddr, resolvedname);
if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0) {
debug2("%s: auth_rhosts2 refused "
"user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" addr \"%.100s\"",
__func__, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr);
return 0;
}
lookup = resolvedname;
}
debug2("%s: access allowed by auth_rhosts2", __func__);
if (key_is_cert(key) &&
key_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, lookup, &reason)) {
error("%s", reason);
auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
return 0;
}
host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
/* backward compat if no key has been found. */
if (host_status == HOST_NEW) {
host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2,
options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL :
_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
}
if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
if (key_is_cert(key)) {
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
"%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
cuser, lookup);
} else {
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
}
free(fp);
}
return (host_status == HOST_OK);
}
Authmethod method_hostbased = {
"hostbased",
userauth_hostbased,
&options.hostbased_authentication
};
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