• Mihai Moldovan's avatar
    CVE patches were previously not included in release tarballs. · 96efadac
    Mihai Moldovan authored
    Rename:
        - 1001-LZW-decompress-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895-From-xorg-lib-X.patch =>
          1001-LZW-decompress-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895-From-xorg-.full.patch
        - 1002-Fix-CVE-2011-4028-File-disclosure-vulnerability.-ups.patch =>
          1002-Fix-CVE-2011-4028-File-disclosure-vulnerability.full.patch
        - 1003-Avoid-use-after-free-in-dix-dixfonts.c-doImageText-C.patch =>
          1003-Avoid-use-after-free-in-dix-dixfonts.c-doImageT.full.patch
        - 1004-CVE-2013-6462-unlimited-sscanf-overflows-stack-buffe.patch =>
          1004-CVE-2013-6462-unlimited-sscanf-overflows-stack-.full.patch
        - 1005-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-Fo.patch =>
          1005-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-.full.patch
        - 1006-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-in-le.patch =>
          1006-CVE-2014-0209-integer-overflow-of-realloc-size-.full.patch
        - 1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_conn_se.patch =>
          1007-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-in-_fs_recv_co.full.patch
        - 1008-Don-t-crash-when-we-receive-an-FS_Error-from-the-fon.patch =>
          1008-Don-t-crash-when-we-receive-an-FS_Error-from-th.full.patch
        - 1009-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-lengths-when-reading-repli.patch =>
          1009-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-lengths-when-reading-.full.patch
        - 1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-_fs_s.patch =>
          1010-CVE-2014-0211-Integer-overflow-in-fs_get_reply-.full.patch
        - 1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_q.patch =>
          1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_r.full.patch
        - 1012-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_read_extent_inf.patch =>
          1012-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_read_exten.full.patch
        - 1013-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_alloc_glyphs-fr.patch =>
          1013-CVE-2014-0211-integer-overflow-in-fs_alloc_glyp.full.patch
        - 1014-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_e.patch =>
          1014-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_r.full.patch
        - 1015-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_g.patch =>
          1015-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_r.full.patch
        - 1016-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch =>
          1016-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_r.full.patch
        - 1017-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_read_l.patch =>
          1017-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_r.full.patch
        - 1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-crash-.patch =>
          1018-unchecked-malloc-may-allow-unauthed-client-to-c.full.patch
        - 1019-dix-integer-overflow-in-ProcPutImage-CVE-2014-8092-1.patch =>
          1019-dix-integer-overflow-in-ProcPutImage-CVE-2014-8.full.patch
        - 1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-2-4.patch =>
          1020-dix-integer-overflow-in-GetHosts-CVE-2014-8092-.full.patch
        - 1021-dix-integer-overflow-in-RegionSizeof-CVE-2014-8092-3.patch =>
          1021-dix-integer-overflow-in-RegionSizeof-CVE-2014-8.full.patch
        - 1022-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-2014-.patch =>
          1022-dix-integer-overflow-in-REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE-CVE-.full.patch
        - 1023-dbe-unvalidated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls-CVE-.patch =>
          1023-dbe-unvalidated-lengths-in-DbeSwapBuffers-calls.full.patch
        - 1024-Xi-unvalidated-lengths-in-Xinput-extension-CVE-2014-.patch =>
          1024-Xi-unvalidated-lengths-in-Xinput-extension-CVE-.full.patch
        - 1025-xcmisc-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXCMiscGetXIDList-C.patch =>
          1025-xcmisc-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXCMiscGetXIDL.full.patch
        - 1026-Xv-unvalidated-lengths-in-XVideo-extension-swapped-p.patch =>
          1026-Xv-unvalidated-lengths-in-XVideo-extension-swap.full.patch
        - 1027-render-check-request-size-before-reading-it-CVE-2014.patch =>
          1027-render-check-request-size-before-reading-it-CVE.full.patch
        - 1028-render-unvalidated-lengths-in-Render-extn.-swapped-p.patch =>
          1028-render-unvalidated-lengths-in-Render-extn.-swap.full.patch
        - 1029-xfixes-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXFixesSelectSelect.patch =>
          1029-xfixes-unvalidated-length-in-SProcXFixesSelectS.full.patch
        - 1030-randr-unvalidated-lengths-in-RandR-extension-swapped.patch =>
          1030-randr-unvalidated-lengths-in-RandR-extension-sw.full.patch
        - 1031-glx-Be-more-paranoid-about-variable-length-requests-.patch =>
          1031-glx-Be-more-paranoid-about-variable-length-requ.full.patch
        - 1032-glx-Be-more-strict-about-rejecting-invalid-image-siz.patch =>
          1032-glx-Be-more-strict-about-rejecting-invalid-imag.full.patch
        - 1033-glx-Additional-paranoia-in-__glXGetAnswerBuffer-__GL.patch =>
          1033-glx-Additional-paranoia-in-__glXGetAnswerBuffer.full.patch
        - 1034-glx-Add-safe_-add-mul-pad-v3-CVE-2014-8093-4-6-v4.patch =>
          1034-glx-Add-safe_-add-mul-pad-v3-CVE-2014-8093-4-6-.full.patch
        - 1035-glx-Length-checking-for-GLXRender-requests-v2-CVE-20.patch =>
          1035-glx-Length-checking-for-GLXRender-requests-v2-C.full.patch
        - 1036-glx-Integer-overflow-protection-for-non-generated-re.patch =>
          1036-glx-Integer-overflow-protection-for-non-generat.full.patch
        - 1037-glx-Top-level-length-checking-for-swapped-VendorPriv.patch =>
          1037-glx-Top-level-length-checking-for-swapped-Vendo.full.patch
        - 1038-glx-Length-checking-for-non-generated-single-request.patch =>
          1038-glx-Length-checking-for-non-generated-single-re.full.patch
        - 1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2-CVE-.patch =>
          1039-glx-Length-checking-for-RenderLarge-requests-v2.full.patch
        - 1040-glx-Pass-remaining-request-length-into-varsize-v2-CV.patch =>
          1040-glx-Pass-remaining-request-length-into-varsize-.full.patch
        - 1041-nx-X11-lib-font-fc-fserve.c-initialize-remaining-buf.patch =>
          1041-nx-X11-lib-font-fc-fserve.c-initialize-remainin.full.patch
        - 1042-Do-proper-input-validation-to-fix-for-CVE-2011-2895.patch =>
          1042-Do-proper-input-validation-to-fix-for-CVE-2011-.full.patch
        - 1101-Coverity-844-845-846-Fix-memory-leaks.patch =>
          1101-Coverity-844-845-846-Fix-memory-leaks.full.patch
        - 1102-include-introduce-byte-counting-functions.patch =>
          1102-include-introduce-byte-counting-functions.full.patch
        - 1103-xkb-Don-t-swap-XkbSetGeometry-data-in-the-input-buff.patch =>
          1103-xkb-Don-t-swap-XkbSetGeometry-data-in-the-input.full.patch
        - 1104-xkb-Check-strings-length-against-request-size.patch =>
          1104-xkb-Check-strings-length-against-request-size.full.patch
    96efadac
1011-CVE-2014-0210-unvalidated-length-fields-in-fs_r.full.patch 4.33 KB
From e29bbd5bf0565eaf7c02f85a57b87f66531fa6b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mike DePaulo <mikedep333@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 22:08:09 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 11/40] CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length fields in
 fs_read_query_info() from xorg/lib/libXfont commit
 491291cabf78efdeec8f18b09e14726a9030cc8f

fs_read_query_info() parses a reply from the font server.  The reply
contains embedded length fields, none of which are validated.  This
can cause out of bound reads in either fs_read_query_info() or in
_fs_convert_props() which it calls to parse the fsPropInfo in the reply.

v2: apply correctly on nx-libs 3.6.x (Mihai Moldovan)
---
 nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
 nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c    | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c
index 9a5e194..afa2c32 100644
--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c
+++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fsconvert.c
@@ -123,6 +123,10 @@ _fs_convert_props(fsPropInfo *pi, fsPropOffset *po, pointer pd,
     for (i = 0; i < nprops; i++, dprop++, is_str++) 
     {
 	memcpy(&local_off, off_adr, SIZEOF(fsPropOffset));
+	if ((local_off.name.position >= pi->data_len) ||
+		(local_off.name.length >
+		 (pi->data_len - local_off.name.position)))
+	    goto bail;
 	dprop->name = MakeAtom(&pdc[local_off.name.position],
 			       local_off.name.length, 1);
 	if (local_off.type != PropTypeString) {
@@ -130,15 +134,20 @@ _fs_convert_props(fsPropInfo *pi, fsPropOffset *po, pointer pd,
 	    dprop->value = local_off.value.position;
 	} else {
 	    *is_str = TRUE;
+	    if ((local_off.value.position >= pi->data_len) ||
+			(local_off.value.length >
+			 (pi->data_len - local_off.value.position)))
+			goto bail;
 	    dprop->value = (INT32) MakeAtom(&pdc[local_off.value.position],
 					    local_off.value.length, 1);
 	    if (dprop->value == BAD_RESOURCE)
 	    {
-		xfree (pfi->props);
-		pfi->nprops = 0;
-		pfi->props = 0;
-		pfi->isStringProp = 0;
-		return -1;
+		  bail:
+			xfree (pfi->props);
+			pfi->nprops = 0;
+			pfi->props = 0;
+			pfi->isStringProp = 0;
+			return -1;
 	    }
 	}
 	off_adr += SIZEOF(fsPropOffset);
diff --git a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c
index 9e652d2..75cabdd 100644
--- a/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c
+++ b/nx-X11/lib/font/fc/fserve.c
@@ -866,6 +866,7 @@ fs_read_query_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
     FSFpePtr		conn = (FSFpePtr) fpe->private;
     fsQueryXInfoReply	*rep;
     char		*buf;
+    long		bufleft = 0; /* length of reply left to use */
     fsPropInfo		*pi;
     fsPropOffset	*po;
     pointer		pd;
@@ -896,7 +897,10 @@ fs_read_query_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
 
     buf = (char *) rep;
     buf += SIZEOF(fsQueryXInfoReply);
-    
+ 
+    bufleft = rep->length << 2;
+    bufleft -= SIZEOF(fsQueryXInfoReply);
+
     /* move the data over */
     fsUnpack_XFontInfoHeader(rep, pInfo);
     
@@ -904,19 +908,52 @@ fs_read_query_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
     _fs_init_fontinfo(conn, pInfo);
 
     /* Compute offsets into the reply */
+    if (bufleft < SIZEOF(fsPropInfo))
+    {
+	ret = -1;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr, "fsQueryXInfo: bufleft (%ld) < SIZEOF(fsPropInfo)\n",
+		bufleft);
+#endif
+	goto bail;
+    }
     pi = (fsPropInfo *) buf;
     buf += SIZEOF (fsPropInfo);
-    
+    bufleft -= SIZEOF (fsPropInfo);
+
+    if ((bufleft / SIZEOF (fsPropOffset)) < pi->num_offsets)
+    {
+	ret = -1;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr,
+		"fsQueryXInfo: (bufleft / SIZEOF (fsPropOffset)) (%ld) < pi->num_offsets (%d)\n",
+		bufleft / SIZEOF (fsPropOffset), pi->num_offsets);
+#endif
+	goto bail;
+    }
     po = (fsPropOffset *) buf;
     buf += pi->num_offsets * SIZEOF(fsPropOffset);
+    bufleft -= pi->num_offsets * SIZEOF(fsPropOffset);
 
+    if (bufleft < pi->data_len)
+    {
+	ret = -1;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr,
+		"fsQueryXInfo: bufleft (%ld) < data_len (%d)\n",
+		bufleft, pi->data_len);
+#endif
+	goto bail;
+    }
     pd = (pointer) buf;
     buf += pi->data_len;
+    bufleft -= pi->data_len;
     
     /* convert the properties and step over the reply */
     ret = _fs_convert_props(pi, po, pd, pInfo);
+  bail:    
     _fs_done_read (conn, rep->length << 2);
-    
+
     if (ret == -1)
     {
 	fs_cleanup_bfont (bfont);
-- 
2.1.4