library clean-up: Don't build libNX_Xpm anymore. Use system's libXpm shared library.

 One release goal for version 3.6.x of nx-libs is dropping as many bundled libraries as possible that haven't 
 been adapted to nx-libs.

 Starting with libNX_Xpm here.

 The libNX_Xpm library is only referenced once (nx-X11/programs/Xserver/hw/nxagent/Holder.c).
 When grepping through Xserver/hw/nxagent the suspicion comes up, that the libXpm linkage is not
 needed at all, because none of the provided functions are used inside the nxagent Xserver.

Ensure that the given strings length in an XkbSetGeometry request remain
within the limits of the size of the request.

v3: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x because this is
the CVE-2015-0255 fix (Mike DePaulo)
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit 20079c36cf7d377938ca5478447d8b9045cb7d43)
(cherry picked from commit f160e722672dbb2b5215870b47bcc51461d96ff1)
Signed-off-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org>

The XkbSetGeometry request embeds data which needs to be swapped when the
server and the client have different endianess.

_XkbSetGeometry() invokes functions that swap these data directly in the
input buffer.

However, ProcXkbSetGeometry() may call _XkbSetGeometry() more than once
(if there is more than one keyboard), thus causing on swapped clients the
same data to be swapped twice in memory, further causing a server crash
because the strings lengths on the second time are way off bounds.

To allow _XkbSetGeometry() to run reliably more than once with swapped
clients, do not swap the data in the buffer, use variables instead.

v3: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x as a prereq for
the CVE-2015-0255 fix (Mike DePaulo)
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit 81c90dc8f0aae3b65730409b1b615b5fa7280ebd)
(cherry picked from commit 29be310c303914090298ddda93a5bd5d00a94945)
Signed-off-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org>
index 2405090..7db0959 100644

This patch adds the following three functions:
 bits_to_bytes(bits) - the number of bytes needed to hold 'bits'
 bytes_to_int32(bytes) - the number of 4-byte units to hold 'bytes'
 pad_to_int32(bytes) - the closest multiple of 4 equal to or larger than
                        'bytes'.

All three operations are common in protocol processing and currently the
server has ((foo + 7)/8 + 3)/4 operations all over the place. A common set
of functions reduce the error rate of these (albeit simple) calculations and
improve readability of the code.

The functions do not check for overflow.

v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x as a prereq for
the CVE-2015-0255 fix (Mike DePaulo)
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>

v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x as a prereq for
the CVE-2015-0255 fix (Mike DePaulo)

Make nxagent aware of its NX'ish version string (and number).

  This feature copies the way how X.Org version string and number
  are propagated at build time.

  First use case: if people start nxagent, it reports its version number
  on stderr. This is about being human-friendly.

  Second use case: None, so far. But it will now be easy to use
  the NXAGENT_VERSION_STRING in later feature add-ons.

It ensures that all valid input can be decompressed, checks that the
overflow conditions doesn't happen and generally tightens the
validation of the LZW stream and doesn't pessimize the inner loop for
no good reason. It's derived from a change in libarchive from 2004.

v2: backports to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mihai Moldovan)
v3: fix comment lines starting with "+" + whitespace fixes (Mike Gabriel)
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu.herrb@laas.fr>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>

This reverts commit 6acafc93.

Makefile.nx-libs: Fix uninstall-lite rule. The nxproxy and nxcomp uninstallation has to be in uninstall-lite, not in uninstall-full.

Conflicts (resolved by Mike Gabriel):
	debian/changelog

It ensures that all valid input can be decompressed, checks that the
overflow conditions doesn't happen and generally tightens the
validation of the LZW stream and doesn't pessimize the inner loop for
no good reason. It's derived from a change in libarchive from 2004.

v2: backports to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mihai Moldovan)
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu.herrb@laas.fr>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>

GetHosts() iterates over all the hosts it has in memory, and copies
them to a buffer. The buffer length is calculated by iterating over
all the hosts and adding up all of their combined length. There is a
potential integer overflow, if there are lots and lots of hosts (with
a combined length of > ~4 gig). This should be possible by repeatedly
calling ProcChangeHosts() on 64bit machines with enough memory.

This patch caps the list at 1mb, because multi-megabyte hostname
lists for X access control are insane.

v2: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo)
v3: human-readable version of "1 MB" (Mihai Moldovan)
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>

Conflicts:
	os/access.c

This reverts commit d4c76981.

CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length in _fs_recv_conn_setup() from xorg/lib/libXfont commit 891e084b26837162b12f841060086a105edde86d

The connection setup reply from the font server can include a list
of alternate servers to contact if this font server stops working.

The reply specifies a total size of all the font server names, and
then provides a list of names. _fs_recv_conn_setup() allocated the
specified total size for copying the names to, but didn't check to
make sure it wasn't copying more data to that buffer than the size
it had allocated.

v2: use xfree() instead of free() for nx-libs 3.6.x (Mihai Moldovan)

Revert "CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length in _fs_recv_conn_setup() from xorg/lib/libXfont commit 891e084b26837162b12f841060086a105edde86d"

This reverts commit 94c6de06.

CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length fields in fs_read_query_info() from xorg/lib/libXfont commit 491291cabf78efdeec8f18b09e14726a9030cc8f

fs_read_query_info() parses a reply from the font server.  The reply
contains embedded length fields, none of which are validated.  This
can cause out of bound reads in either fs_read_query_info() or in
_fs_convert_props() which it calls to parse the fsPropInfo in the reply.

v2: apply correctly on nx-libs 3.6.x (Mihai Moldovan)

Revert "CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length fields in fs_read_query_info() from xorg/lib/libXfont commit 491291cabf78efdeec8f18b09e14726a9030cc8f"

This reverts commit c6aebf92.

v2: Handle more multiplies in indirect_reqsize.c (Julien Cristau)

v3: RHEL5 backport

v4: backport to nx-libs 3.6.x (Mike DePaulo)
Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger <aritger@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Fedora X Ninjas <x@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>