Commit db57bbc4 authored by lpsolit%gmail.com's avatar lpsolit%gmail.com

Docs for bug 245877: use testagent.cgi and testserver.pl to test your…

Docs for bug 245877: use testagent.cgi and testserver.pl to test your installation - Patch by me, r=justdave
parent 79584710
<!-- <!DOCTYPE chapter PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.1.2//EN"> -->
<!-- $Id: installation.xml,v 1.132 2008/04/04 06:48:02 lpsolit%gmail.com Exp $ -->
<!-- $Id: installation.xml,v 1.133 2008/04/04 06:48:03 lpsolit%gmail.com Exp $ -->
<chapter id="installing-bugzilla">
<title>Installing Bugzilla</title>
......@@ -957,7 +957,10 @@
<para>
Configure your web server according to the instructions in the
appropriate section. (If it makes a difference in your choice,
the Bugzilla Team recommends Apache.) Regardless of which webserver
the Bugzilla Team recommends Apache.) To check whether your web server
is correctly configured, try to access <filename>testagent.cgi</filename>
from your web server. If "OK" is displayed, then your configuration
is successful. Regardless of which web server
you are using, however, ensure that sensitive information is
not remotely available by properly applying the access controls in
<xref linkend="security-webserver-access"/>. You can run
......
<!-- <!DOCTYPE chapter PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.1.2//EN"> -->
<!-- $Id: security.xml,v 1.7 2008/04/04 06:48:14 lpsolit%gmail.com Exp $ -->
<!-- $Id: security.xml,v 1.16 2008/04/04 06:48:23 lpsolit%gmail.com Exp $ -->
<chapter id="security">
<title>Bugzilla Security</title>
......@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@
<quote>SYSTEM</quote> introduces obvious security concerns, the
problems introduced by running everything as <quote>nobody</quote> may
not be so obvious. Basically, if you run every daemon as
<quote>nobody</quote> and one of them gets comprimised it can
comprimise every other daemon running as <quote>nobody</quote> on your
<quote>nobody</quote> and one of them gets compromised it can
compromise every other daemon running as <quote>nobody</quote> on your
machine. For this reason, it is recommended that you create a user
account for each daemon.
</para>
......@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@
<title>The MySQL System Account</title>
<para>As mentioned in <xref linkend="security-os-accounts"/>, the MySQL
daemon should run as a non-privleged, unique user. Be sure to consult
daemon should run as a non-privileged, unique user. Be sure to consult
the MySQL documentation or the documentation that came with your system
for instructions.
</para>
......@@ -141,15 +141,15 @@
have no other reason to access MySQL remotely, then you should disable
the network access. This, along with the suggestion in
<xref linkend="security-os-ports"/>, will help protect your system from
any remote vulnerabilites in MySQL.
any remote vulnerabilities in MySQL.
</para>
<example id="security-mysql-network-ex">
<title>Disabling Networking in MySQL</title>
<para>Simply enter the following in <filename>/etc/my.conf</filename>:
<para>Simply enter the following in <filename>/etc/my.cnf</filename>:
<screen>
[myslqd]
[mysqld]
# Prevent network access to MySQL.
skip-networking
</screen>
......@@ -171,20 +171,19 @@ skip-networking
<section id="security-webserver">
<title>Webserver</title>
<title>Web server</title>
<section id="security-webserver-access">
<title>Disabling Remote Access to Bugzilla Configuration Files</title>
<para>There are many files that are placed in the Bugzilla directory
area that should not be accessable from the web. Because of the way
Bugzilla is currently layed out, the list of what should and should not
be accessible is rather complicated. A new installation method is
currently in the works which should solve this by allowing files that
shouldn't be accessible from the web to be placed in a directory outside
the webroot. See
<ulink url="http://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=44659">bug 44659</ulink>
for more information.
<para>
There are many files that are placed in the Bugzilla directory
area that should not be accessible from the web. Because of the way
Bugzilla is currently layed out, the list of what should and should not
be accessible is rather complicated. A quick way is to run
<filename>testserver.pl</filename> to check if your web server serves
Bugzilla files as expected. If not, you may want to follow the few
steps below.
</para>
<tip>
......@@ -293,23 +292,19 @@ skip-networking
</itemizedlist>
<para>Be sure to test that data that should not be accessed remotely is
properly blocked. Of particular intrest is the localconfig file which
properly blocked. Of particular interest is the localconfig file which
contains your database password. Also, be aware that many editors
create temporary and backup files in the working directory and that
those should also not be accessable. For more information, see
those should also not be accessible. For more information, see
<ulink url="http://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=186383">bug 186383</ulink>
or
<ulink url="http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/6501">Bugtraq ID 6501</ulink>.
To test, simply point your web browser at the file; for example, to
test mozilla.org's installation, we'd try to access
<ulink url="http://bugzilla.mozilla.org/localconfig"/>. You should get
a <quote><errorcode>403</errorcode> <errorname>Forbidden</errorname></quote>
error.
To test, simply run <filename>testserver.pl</filename>, as said above.
</para>
<tip>
<para>Be sure to check <xref linkend="http"/> for instructions
specific to the webserver you use.
specific to the web server you use.
</para>
</tip>
......@@ -352,28 +347,25 @@ skip-networking
<section id="security-bugzilla-charset">
<title>Prevent users injecting malicious Javascript</title>
<para>It is possible for a Bugzilla user to take advantage of character
set encoding ambiguities to inject HTML into Bugzilla comments. This
could include malicious scripts.
Due to internationalization concerns, we are unable to
incorporate by default the code changes suggested by
<para>If you installed Bugzilla version 2.22 or later from scratch,
then the <emphasis>utf8</emphasis> parameter is switched on by default.
This makes Bugzilla explicitly set the character encoding, following
<ulink
url="http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/malicious_code_mitigation.html#3">the
CERT advisory</ulink> on this issue.
Making the change in <xref linkend="security-bugzilla-charset-ex"/> will
prevent this problem.
url="http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/malicious_code_mitigation.html#3">a
CERT advisory</ulink> recommending exactly this.
The following therefore does not apply to you; just keep
<emphasis>utf8</emphasis> turned on.
</para>
<example id="security-bugzilla-charset-ex">
<title>Forcing Bugzilla to output a charset</title>
<para>Locate the following line in
<filename>Bugzilla/CGI.pm</filename>:
<programlisting>$self->charset('');</programlisting>
and change it to:
<programlisting>$self->charset('UTF-8');</programlisting>
</para>
</example>
<para>If you've upgraded from an older version, then it may be possible
for a Bugzilla user to take advantage of character set encoding
ambiguities to inject HTML into Bugzilla comments.
This could include malicious scripts.
This is because due to internationalization concerns, we are unable to
turn the <emphasis>utf8</emphasis> parameter on by default for upgraded
installations.
Turning it on manually will prevent this problem.
</para>
</section>
</section>
......
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